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TITLE VII-THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES As A DEFENSE To PRI­
VATE PLAINTIFF TITLE VII EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to 
eliminate employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, 
sex, and national origin. I To accomplish these goals, Congress created 
the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC)2 to investigate charges of unlawful employment practices and 
I. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 
241,253-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. 1987». 
Congress' objective in enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to achieve 
equal employment opportunities and to remove artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barri­
ers that in the past operated to favor some groups of employees over others. Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). Consequently, by virtue of the major sub­
stantive prohibitions of § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), Title VII of the Act provides, 
with respect to employers, that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em­
ployer­
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis­
, criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi­
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in 
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportuniti~ or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). The Act also prohibits discriminatory conduct by employ­
ment agencies and labor unions. Id. at § 2000e-2(b), (c). 
2. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-4(a) (1982). The EEOC is designed to eliminate discriminatory 
employment practices by certain employers, unions and employment agencies. Under Title 
VII, the EEOC is charged with preventing employers from engaging in any unlawful em­
ployment practice set forth in specific provisions of Title VII. Id. § 2000e-5(a). Generally, 
the EEOC's powers are twofold. First, the EEOC is empowered to receive and investigate 
charges of discrimination in employment; and second, if it determines that reasonable cause 
exists to believe that a cliarge is true, the EEOC is empowered to attempt through concilia­
tion and persuasion to resolve disputes involving such charges. Id. § 2000e-5(b). 
In addition, the EEOC has the power to issue, amend or rescind suitable procedural 
regulatioris to cOarry out the provisions of Title VII. Id. § 2000e-12(a). These EEOC proce­
dural regulations may be found at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.1-.80 (1988 & Supp. 1989). Specifi­
cally, the EEOC has promulgated interpretive regulations on discrimination because of sex, 
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to bring about voluntary settlement of employment discrimination 
claims. 3 In addition to creating the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, Congress created a private right of action in the party 
who alleges employment discrimination.4 
In 1972, Congress amended Title VII by passing the Equal Em­
ployment Opportunity Act.5 Among other changes,6 the amendment 
religion, national origin, and employee selection procedures. Id. §§ 1604-1607 (1988). In 
addition, EEOC procedures regarding recordkeeping and reports can be found at 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1602 (1988). These regulations have largely been accepted by the courts as definitive with 
respect to the issues to which they address themselves. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) ("The EqualEmployment Opportunity Commission, hav­
ing enforcement responsibility, has issued guidelines .... The administrative interpretation 
of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to great deference."). See also Meritor Sav­
ings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986); EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 74 n.28, 
79 n.36 (1984); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 761 (1979); General Electric 
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 
431 (1975); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (Interpretative regulations, 
"while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of 
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for 
guidance."); EEOC v. Texas Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 1986). 
3. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(a), (b) (1982). There are two methods for instituting an ad­
ministrative proceeding before the EEOC. First, a person claiming to be aggrieved may file 
a charge in writing and under oath. Id. § 2000e-5(b). Second, a member of the EEOC who 
has reasonable cause to believe that a violation has occurred may file a written charge made 
under oath. Id. 
4. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(I) (1982). Any person whom the charge alleges was ag­
grieved by the alleged unlawful employment practice may bring a private action against the 
person or employer alleged to have violated Title VII. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(I) 
provides: 
If a charge filed with the Commission ... is dismissed by the Commission, or if 
within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge ... the Com­
mission has not filed a civil action ... , or the Commission has not entered into a 
conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission 
... shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of 
such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the 
charge . . . by the person claiming to be aggrieved . . . . 
Id. 
5. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 
(amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716,78 
Stat. 241, 253-66, and codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982 & 
Supp. 1987». 
6. Title VII, as originally enacted in 1964, afforded a remedy for employment dis­
crimination only to employees in the private sector. The 1972 amendment expanded cover­
age to employees of state and local governments, as well as to employees of the federal 
government. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-a (1982). In addition, the 1972 amendment increased Title 
VII coverage to businesses with fifteen or more employees, whereas only businesses with 
twenty-five or more employees were covered prior to the amendment. Id. § 2000e-b (1982 
& Supp. 1987). 
With respect to federal employees, the 1972 amendment added section 717. This sec­
tion requires that "[a]ll [federal] personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for 
employment ... be made free from any. discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or 
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empowered the EEOC to bring an action against the employer in a 
federal district court.7 The employee's private right to sue, originally 
created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was retained in the 1972 ActS 
and, even today, continues to be one of the "most important enforce­
ment mechanism[s] in Title VII."9 
Under the Act, as amended, private claimants are entitled to 
prompt processing of their charge by the EEOC. 10 In fact, the legisla­
tive history of Title VII establishes that it is appropriate for the indi­
vidual to pursue a private action when delay is occasioned by the 
inefficiencies of the administrative agency. 11 Section 706(f)(1) of Title 
VII, however, permits the claimant to await the termination of EEOC 
proceedings before filing suit and does not impose any maximum time 
period within which the EEOC must conclude its administrative pro­
ceedings and conciliation efforts.12 
In the absence of such a statutory limitation on a Title VII claim­
ant's right to await the conclusion of EEOC action, courts have con­
sidered whether equitable principles may be applied to protect Title 
VII defendants who have been prejudiced because of an unreasonable 
national origin." Id. § 2000e-16 (1982). This new section also gives anyone who has filed a 
charge of discrimination against a federal agency the right to sue the agency in federal 
court under § 706 if the charge has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the charging 
party within one hundred and eighty days. Id. § 2000e-16(c), (d). 
7. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(I) (1982). The 1972 amendment provided that "[i]fwithin 
thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission ... the Commission has been unable 
to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the 
Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent ... named in the charge." Id. 
8. Under the Act, a private party may bring an action if the EEOC dismisses the 
employment discrimination charge, enters into an unacceptable conciliation agreement, or 
does not act upon the charge within one hundred and eighty days. Id. If the EEOC fails to 
act within the 180-day period, it must notify the complainant, who then has the option of 
filing a private suit within ninety days after receiving such notice, or awaiting completion of 
the EEOC's administration of the charge. Id. See supra note 4 for the text of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(f)(I) which provides for a private right of action in a party who alleges employ­
ment discrimination. 
9. 21 AM. JUR. TRIALS Employment Discrimination § 4, at 19 (1974). 
10. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 13, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2148. 
11. Id. Under Title VII, Congress provides an aggrieved person the opportunity to 
bring an independent action against the respondent if the EEOC has not issued a notice of 
right to sue within one hundred and eighty days. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(I) (1982). "The 
committee believes that aggrieved persons are entitled to have their cases processed 
promptly ... [t]he primary concern must be protection of the aggrieved person's option to 
seek a prompt remedy in the best manner available." H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 13, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2148. 
12. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982). For the text of 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(I), see 
supra note 4. 
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or inexcusable delay by the claimant in filing an action.13 These courts 
have ruled, under certain circumstances, that the equitable doctrine of 
laches l4 may be applied as a time limitation on a Title VII claimant's 
right to bring suit. 15 Specifically, where courts find inexcusable and 
unreasonable delay in seeking a remedy, and prejudice to the defend­
ant by the passage of time, 16 the defense of laches has been successfully 
applied to bar a Title VII claim. 17 
This comment addresses the specific question of whether the equi­
table doctrine of laches might bar a private plaintiff's Title VII em­
ployment discrimination action, when the claimant has timely filed 
charges as required under section 706,18 but, before filing suit, has cho­
13. A court of equity may refuse relief to one who has been .dilatory !)r wa'1ting ill 
diligence in prosecuting a cause of action. See Urquhart v. McDonald, 252 Ala. 505, 509, 
42 So. 2d 9, 13 (1949). 
14. The maxim that equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights, 
expresses the concept which is fundamental to the doctrine of laches. See New York City 
v. Pine, 185 U.S. 93, 98 (1902); Farm Bureau Mut. Auto In~. Co. v. Houle: 118 Vt. 154, 
159, 102 A.2d 326, 329 (1954). The basis of the doctrine of laches is said to be public 
policy, which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale demands. See, 
e.g., Mackall v. Casilear, 137 U.S. 556, 566 (1890); Davidson v. Grady, 105 F.2d 405, 408 
(5th Cir. 1939); Denison v. McCann, 303 Ky. 195, 198, 197 S.W.2d 248, 249 (1946); Wil­
helm v. Pfinning, 191 Okla. 321, 323, 129 P.2d 580, 582 (1942). The doctrine is based on 
the injustice of allowing recovery where no explanation is given for unreasonable and inju­
rious delay, and is based, in part, on the injustice that might result from the enforcement of 
a neglected right or claim. See City of Paducah v. Gillispie, 273 Ky. 101, 104, 115 S.W.2d 
574, 575 (1938); O'Grady v. Deery, 94 N.H. 5, 7-8, 45 A.2d 295, 297 (1946). 
15. See, e.g., Garrett v. General Motors Corp., 844 F.2d 559 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
109 S. Ct. 259 (1988); Cleveland Newspaper Guild, Local 1 v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 
839 F.2d 1147 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 245 (1988); Whitfield v. Anheuser-Busch, 
Inc., 820 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1987); Waddell v. Small Tube Products, Inc., 799 F.2d 69 (3d 
Cir. 1986); Jeffries V. Chicago Transit Auth., 770 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 
U.S. 1050 (1986); Brown v. Continental Can Co., 765 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1985); Howard V. 
Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1984); Rozen v. District of Columbia, 
702 F.2d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Boone v. Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th 
Cir. 1979); Bernard V. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 452 U.S. 89 
(1981). 
16. In equity a party is not permitted to sleep on a right of action to the prejudice of 
the party against whom a claim is made, and who by the delay may be deprived of the 
evidence and means of making an effective defense. See supra notes 13-14. A demand must 
be made within a reasonable time, otherwise the claim is considered stale, and courts of 
equity have refused to aid stale demands where the party has acquiesced for a great length 
of time. See, e.g., Urquhart V. McDonald, 252 Ala. 505, 509, 42 So. 2d 9, 13 (1949); Samp­
son v. Cottongim, 249 Ky. 670, 671, 61 S.W.2d 309,310 (1933); Burns v. Dillon, 226 Ky. 
82,88,9 S.W.2d 1095,1098 (1928). See also Lorenz V. Rowley, 122 Vt. 480, 485,177 A.2d 
364, 368 (1962). 
17. See, e.g., Garrett v. General Motors Corp., 844 F.2d 559 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
109 S. Ct. 259 (1988); Jeffries V. Chicago Transit Auth., 770 F.2d 676, 680-82 (7th Cir. 
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050 (1986). 
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982). For the text of 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(1), see 
supra note 4. 
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sen to await the conclusion of extended EEOC proceedings. Consider­
ation of this issue must address two competing concerns which 
provide the major background for this comment. First, the concern 
for the Title VII claimant's statutory right to await the termination of 
EEOC proceedings before initiating a suit in federal court and the leg­
islative policy reflected in Title VII which favors the administrative 
resolution of claims by the EEOC must be examined. Second, the in­
terest in limiting prejudice and inconvenience to the employer in de­
fending a Title VII action, due to the EEOC's inability to act 
promptly, must be scrutinized. In light of these concerns, courts have 
had to decide whether it is unreasonable or inexcusable, pursuant to a 
laches defense, for a private plaintiff to delay filing suit until the EEOC 
has made its determination and issued a right-to-sue letter. 
Part I of this comment traces the origin of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, the legislative intent behind the creation of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the EEOC's au­
thority to administer Title VII discrimination claims. Part II exam­
ines the development of the doctrine of laches as an equitable time 
limitation on a Title VII claimant's right to bring suit. 
Part III of this comment focuses on the question of whether 
laches may be applied in particular instances where a Title VII claim­
ant awaits the conclusion of extended EEOC proceedings, receives a 
right-to-sue letter and files suit within ninety days of receipt of the 
right-to-sue letter. Part III surveys various federal courts of appeals' 
decisions which consider the applicability of the defense of laches to 
Title VII private plaintiffs under these circumstances. Specifically, 
this section separates the cases into two categories. The courts of ap­
peals which support the classic laches approach will be examined,19 
followed by a discussion of the courts of appeals which adhere to the 
contrasting presumption approach.20 
19. The courts which follow the classic laches approach accept the defense of laches 
as an equitable time limitation on the private plaintiff's right to file suit in federal court. 
See, e.g., Garrett v. General Motors Corp., 844 F.2d 559 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, \09 S. Ct. 
259 (1988); Jeffries v. Chicago Transit Auth., 770 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 
475 U.S. \050 (\986). See also Whitfield v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 820 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 
1987). 
20. The courts which follow the presumption approach generally have held that the 
private plaintiff is entitled to await the completion of EEOC proceedings before filing suit. 
See, e.g., Brown v. Continental Can Co., 765 F.2d 8\0 (9th Cir. 1985); Howard v. Roadway 
Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1984); Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249 (5th 
Cir. 1979), aff'd, 452 U.S. 89 (1981). These courts have shown repeated reluctance to 
dismiss a private plaintiff's claim on the basis of laches and, therefore, have limited the 
application of laches to rare cases. See, e.g., Cleveland Newspaper Guild, Local I v. Plain 
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While there does not appear to be a viable solution to the ques­
tions of whether laches should apply in the particular circumstances 
involved or at what point the elements of laches have been established, 
there is an alternative answer available to the question of how laches 
could apply when it is raised as a defense to a Title VII claim. In Part 
IV, this comment suggests a method by which the district courts may 
locate "a just result"21 without limiting the right of a Title VII private 
plaintiff to await the EEOC's administrative resolution of claims and 
without providing for the indefinite tolling of a claim to the prejudice 
of the defendant-employer. 
I. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
A. Legislative History and the Literal Requirements of Title VII 
In 1964, in response to a compelling national need and concern,22 
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.23 The purpose of 
Title VII was to eliminate discrimination in employment based on 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin24 through the utilization of 
Dealer Publishing Co., 839 F.2d 1147 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 245 (1988); Boone 
v. Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1979). 
21. The Supreme Court has previously noted that district courts have discretion to 
locate "a just result" in light of the circumstances peculiar to a case. Langnes v. Green, 
282 U.S. 531, 541 (1931). 
22. In enacting Title VII, Congress was concerned mainly with eliminating racial 
discrimination. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprinted in 1964 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2355, 2393-94. The House Report noted that national 
legislation became necessary because progress in eliminating discrimination through state 
and local legislation had proceeded too slowly. Id. In addition, the committee reported 
that the legislative bill dealing with discrimination "is a constitutional and desirable means 
of dealing with the injustices and humiliations of racial and other discrimination. It is a 
reasonable and responsible bill whose provisions are designed effectively to meet an urgent 
and most serious national problem." Id. at 18, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS at 2394. 
23. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 
Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. 
1987)). Title VII is one of the several major titles of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title I 
addresses enforcement of federal voting rights. 42 U.S.c. § 1971(a) (1982 & Supp. 1987). 
Title II regulates elimination of discrimination in public accommodations. Id. § 2000a 
(1982 & Supp. 1987). Title III regulates elimination of discrimination in facilities owned or 
managed by a state or by one of its subdivisions. Id. § 2000b (1982). Title IV provides for 
assistance in the desegregation of schools. Id. § 2000c (1982). Title V outlines the rules of 
procedure of the Commission hearings. Id. § 1975a (1982). Title VI addresses discrimina­
tion in programs receiving federal financial assistance. Id. § 2000d (1982 & Supp. 1987). 
Title VIII requires the compilation of registration and voting statistics. Id. § 2000f (1982). 
Title IX allows for Attorney General intervention after removal in civil rights cases. Id. 
§ 2000h-2 (1982). Title X establishes a Community Relations Service. Id. § 2000g (1982). 
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3 (1982 & Supp. 1987). See supra note 1 for the text 
of § 2000e-2(a) which outlines the unlawful employment practices of an employer. Other 
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formal and informal remedial procedures.25 By its action, Congress 
acknowledged the prevalence of employment discrimination in the 
United States and the need for federal legislation to remedy the inequi­
ties associated with employment discrimination.26 
The Civil Rights Act authorized the establishment of an Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)27 and delegated to it 
the primary responsibility for preventing and eliminating unlawful em­
ployment practices in the United States.28 As enacted in 1964, Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act created the EEOC to administer provisions 
of Title VII and to encourage the achievement of equal opportunity 
employment.29 
Title VII, however, limited the EEOC's functions to the investiga­
tion30 of employment discrimination charges and informal methods of 
unlawful employment practices include discriminating against any employee for making 
charges, testifying, assisting, or participating in enforcement proceedings. [d. § 2000e·3(a). 
In addition, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to print or publish any 
notice or advertisement indicating a prohibited preference, limitation, specification or dis­
crimination, based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. [d. § 2000e-3(b). 
25. The legislative history of Title VII indicates a congressional desire for out-of­
court settlement of Title VII violations. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12­
13, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2147-48. When the EEOC 
determines after an investigation that there is reasonable cause to believe that a charge is 
true, Title VII mandates that it endeavor to eliminate the alleged unlawful employment 
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. 42 U.S.c. 
§ 2000e-5(b) (1982). The EEOC understands its objective under this provision as being to 
achieve voluntary compliance with Title VII by means of a written agreement resulting 
from conciliation. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24 (1988); EEOC CampI. Man. (BNA) § 60.1 (Mar. 
1979). This agreement should embody a just resolution of the issues and assure that the 
respondent will eliminate unlawful employment practices and take appropriate affirmative 
action. [d. 
26. Title VII of the Act was enacted with the primary objective of improving the 
status of minorities and women in the United States. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 3, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2139. 
27. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-4 (1982). 
28. [d. § 2000e-5(a). See supra note 2 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
creation, composition, and political representation of the EEOC. 
29. The United States Supreme Court has said that the objective of Congress in the 
enactment of Title VII "was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove 
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees 
over other employees." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). What is 
required, said the Court, "is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to 
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or 
other impermissible classification." [d. at 431. . 
30. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 705-706, 78 
Stat. 241, 258-61 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to 2000e-5(b) (1982». Title 
VII requires the EEOC to investigate charges it receives. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982). 
The EEOC approaches its investigative task in both formal and informal ways. On the 
informal level, the EEOC requests the employer to allow the EEOC to interview its person­
nel, tour its facilities and inspect its employment records. EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 23 
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conciliation and persuasion. 31 In effect, the failure of EEOC concilia­
tion efforts terminated its involvement in, the claim. Enforcement 
could be achieved, if at all, only if the Title VII claimant initiated a 
private suit within thirty days after the receipt of EEOC notification 
that conciliation efforts had not been successful. 32 
When it originally enacted Title VII, Congress hoped to en­
courage eI?ployers to comply voluntarily with the Act. 33 The refusal 
(Mar. 1979); EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 26 (May 1979). If informal methods are un­
availing, however, the EEOC has subpoena power which it may use in appropriate cases to 
compel'the production of needed evidence. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.16 (1988); EEOC Compl. 
Man. (BNA) § 24 (Aug. 1984). 
Title VII provides that in connection with any investigation of a charge, the EEOC 
shall have access to and the right to copy "any evidence of any person being investigated or 
proceeded against that relates to" the unlawful employment practices prohibited by Title 
VII and that "is relevant to the charge under investigation." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) 
(1982). The information which the EEOC uncovers in its investigation is kept confidential 
from the public, but the parties actually engaged in the investigation, and their attorneys, 
are entitled to examine the EEOC's files under most circumstances. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.22 
(1988); EEOC Com pI. Man. (BNA) § 83.5 (Mar. 1979). 
31. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(a)-(e), 78 
Stat. 241, 259-60 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982». If the EEOC 
determines, after an investigation, that there is reasonable cause to believe that a charge is 
true, Title VII mandates that it endeavor to eliminate the alleged unlawful employment 
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Id. The EEOC 
attempts to "achieve a just resolution of all violations found and to obtain agreement that 
the respondent will eliminate the unlawful employment practice and provide appropriate 
affirmative relief." 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24 (1988). If accepted by the employer, the remedy is 
embodied in a conciliation agreement that is signed by the charging party and the em­
ployer. Id. If the employer fails or refuses to conciliate or to make a good faith effort to 
resolve the dispute, the EEOC may terminate its conciliation efforts and so notify the em­
ployer. Id. § 1601.25. 
32. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(e), 78 Stat. 
241, 260 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1982». When Congress first 
enacted Title VII it selected "[c]ooperation and voluntary compliance ... as the preferred 
means for achieving" the goal of equality of employment opportunities. Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,44 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1058 (1976). To this 
end Congress established an administrative procedure whereby the EEOC "would have an 
opportunity to settle disputes through conference, conciliation, and persuasion before the 
aggrieved party was permitted to file a lawsuit." Id. 
33. 	 H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& 	ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2143-44. The House Report stated: 
During the preparation and presentation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a series of isolated and 
distinguishable events, due, for the most part, to ill-will on the part of some iden­
tifiable individual or organization. It was thought that a scheme which stressed 
conciliation rather than compulsory processes would be more appropriate for the 
resolution of this essentially "human" problem. Litigation, it was thought, would 
be necessary only on an occasional basis in the event of determined recalcitrance. 
Experience, however, has shown this to be an oversimplified expectation, incor­
rect in its conclusions. 
Id. 
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of many employers to comply, however, compelled Congress to 
strengthen the EEOC's investigatory and enforcement powers.34 Sub­
sequently, Congress amended Title VII by passing the Equal Employ­
ment Opportunity Act of 1972.35 The 1972 amendment, while 
enlarging the powers of the EEOC to include enforcement,36 retained 
the previous emphasis on the administrative resolution and concilia­
tion of charges.37 Congress did not abandon its belief that violations 
of the statute could be remedied without resort to the courts. This is 
evidenced by the fact that before the EEOC may bring a civil suit it 
must follow a series of prescribed administrative steps. 38 
The administrative procedures begin with the filing of a charge 
with the EEOC alleging that an employer has engaged in an unlawful 
employment practice.39 A charge ~ust be filed within one hundred 
and eighty days after the occurrence of the allegedly qiscriminatory 
act, and the EEOC is required to serve notice of the charge on the 
34. [d. "Facts, statistical evidence and experience demonstrate that employers, labor 
organizations, employment agencies and joint labor-management committees continue to 
engage in conduct which contravenes the provisions of Title VII. The existence of such 
practices demonstrates the immediate need to effectuate the purposes of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964." [d. at 9, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 2144. 
35. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. \03 
(amending Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716,78 Stat. 241, 253-66, 
and codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (\982 & Supp. 1987». 
36. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f) (1982). Under the 1972 amendment, the EEOC, if it is 
unable to secure an acceptable conciliation agreement within thirty days after filing of the 
charge, may bring an action against any respondent not a government, governmental 
agency or political subdivision named in the charge. [d. at § 2000e-5(f)(I). The EEOC 
may sue on the basis either of a private charge of employment discrimination or on a 
charge filed by a commissioner of the EEOC. In cases against a state or local government, 
the attorney general, rather than the EEOC, is authorized to bring the action. [d. Under 
the 1972 amendment, the individual retains the right to bring a court action if dissatisfied 
with the EEOC's handling of the case. [d. See supra note 7 for the text of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 20(K)e-5(f)(I). 
37. [d. Title VII retains the general scheme of the original act which enables the 
EEOC to process a charge of employment discrimination through the investigation and 
conciliation stages. 118 CONGo REC. 7563, 7564 (1972). In addition, Title VII "now au­
thorizes the EEOC ... to file a civil action against the respondent in an appropriate Federal 
District Court, if it has been unable to eliminate an alleged unlawful employment practice 
by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." [d. 
38. See generally Note, Procedural Prerequisites for Bringing a Title VII Action - 42 
u.s.c. § 2000e-5, 27 How. L.J. 437 (1984). 
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.7(a) (1988) provides: 

A charge that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unlawful employ­

ment practice within the meaning of Title VII may be made by or on behalf of 

any person claiming to be aggrieved. A charge on behalf of a person claiming to 
be aggrieved may be made by any person, agency, or organization. 
[d. 
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employer within ten days of filing. 40 
After serving notice of the charge on the employer, the EEOC 
must commence an investigation to determine whether there is reason­
able cause to believe that the charge is true.41 This investigation 
culminates in a "no cause" or "reasonable cause" determination.42 
The EEOC's determination is to be made "as promptly as possible 
and, so far as practicable, not later than one hundred and twenty days 
from the filing of the charge. "43 If the EEOC determines that there is 
40. 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982) provides that a charge must be filed within one 
hundred and eighty days after the alleged discriminatory act occurred and notice of the 
charge must be served upon the person against whom such charge is made within ten days 
thereafter. The notice of the charge must include the date, place and circumstances of the 
alleged unlawful employment practice. Id. A copy of the charge shall be served by mail or 
in person. 29 C.F.R. § l601.14(a) (1988). 
The purpose of this notice is to alert the Title VII defendant promptly of the possibil­
ity of an enforcement suit so that steps may be taken to protect the defendant's interests. 
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 372 (1977). The courts have differed as to 
whether this period is directory or jurisdictional, the majority concluding that it is simply a 
direction to the EEOC and will not bar a suit if the EEOC fails to give timely notice. 
Thornton v. East Texas Motor Freight, 497 F.2d 416, 424 (6th Cir. 1974) (service of notice 
on a respondent within \0 days is not a jurisdictional requirement). See Note, Time Limi­
tations For Title VII Suits, 14 GA. L. REV. 540, 545 n.28 (1980). The courts are hesitant to 
preclude the enforcement of the plaintiffs' rights on matters which are beyond their control. 
See Sangster v. United Air Lines, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 
633 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981); Askins v. Imperial Reading 
Corp., 420 F. Supp. 413, 416 (W.O. Va. 1976). As a result of this interpretation, it is 
evident that the ten day requirement for notice is not mandatory. 
41. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(b) (1982). Normal EEOC practice, after an EEOC investi­
gation begins, is to conduct an on-site investigation or plant tour. EEOC CornpI. Man. 
(BNA) § 25.2 (June 1985). During the inspection, the investigator will pay particular at­
tention to the charging party's worksite to acquire a general understanding of the work 
environment and specific information relating to the allegations. Id. § 25.5(d)(I). After the 
plant tour, the investigator will customarily request particular records from the employer. 
Id. § 26.1 (May 1979). The types of records which an employer will be expected to provide 
include payroll records, seniority lists, job descriptions, collective bargaining agreements, 
personnel records and the company's written affirmative action program, if there is one. 
Id. § 26.2(c). 
42. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.19, .21 (1988). The result of the EEOC's deliberations is 
called a "determination." Thus, there are two possible determinations for any given 
charge. A "no cause" determination is meant to indicate to the charging party that the 
EEOC has fully considered the allegations and has concluded that there is not reasonable 
cause to believe that employment discrimination has occurred. Id. § 1601.19. If a "no 
.cause" result is reached, the EEOC will dismiss the charge and promptly notify the person 
claiming to be aggrieved, and the respondent, of its action. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(b) (1982). 
A "reasonable cause" decision, on the other hand, signifies a belief by the EEOC that a 
violation of Title VII has in fact occurred. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21 (1988). Title VII requires 
the EEOC, upon reaching a "reasonable cause" decision, to endeavor to eliminate the al­
leged unlawful employment practice. Id. § 1601.24; 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(b) (1982). 
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21(b) (1988) ("the 
Commission shall provide prompt notification of its determination ... to the person claim­
ing to be aggrieved ... and the respondent."). 
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not reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the EEOC must 
dismiss the charge and notify the employee and the employer.44 If, 
however, the EEOC determines "after such investigation that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission 
shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment 
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persua­
sion."45 In conciliation efforts, the EEOC's regulations require it to 
"attempt to achieve a just resolution of all violations found and to 
obtain agreement that the respondent will eliminate the unlawful em­
ployment practice and provide appropriate affirmative relief."46 Suc­
cessful conciliation avoids litigation through the execution of a formal 
conciliation agreement.47 Only after the EEOC determines that it has 
been unsuccessful in securing a satisfactory conciliation agreement 
from an employer may it bring a civil action.48 If the EEOC does not 
bring an action within one hundred and eighty days after the claim is 
filed, it must then notify the aggrieved party of the faiJure of con cilia­
tion.49 The private civil action must be commenced within ninety days 
of receipt from the EEOC of a notice of right to sue. 50 
44. If the EEOC makes a "no cause" determination, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19(a) (1988) 
provides: 
The person claiming to be aggrieved or the person on whose behalf a charge was 
filed may request a review of the issuing director's determination within 14 days 
of the date of the issuing director's determination by the Director .... The issu­
ing director's letter of determination shall inform the person claiming to be ag­
grieved or the person on whose behalf a charge was filed of the right to sue in 
federal district court within 90 days of the date that the issuing director's letter of 
determination becomes the Commission's final determination. 
29 C.F.R. § 1601.19(a) (1988). If the aggrieved does not request a review of the "no cause" . 
determination, the determination becomes final on the 15th day from the date of issuance. 
Id. § 1601.19(a)(I). 
45. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(b) (1982). 
46. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24(a) (1988). 
47. A settlement agreement may be negotiated at several different stages during the 
processing of a discrimination charge. The charge may be resolved in a pre-determination 
settlement negotiated after the charge is filed, but before the EEOC makes a reasonable 
cause determination. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.20 (1988); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EM­
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 944 (2d ed. 1983). The settlement of a claim brought 
under Title VII in a federal district court may be incorporated later in a consent decree, 
subject to the court's approval and enforceable under the court's contempt powers. See 
EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d 1038, 1043-44 (7th Cir. 1982). 
48. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982). 
49. Id. In Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355,361 (1977), the Supreme 
Court held that no section of the Act required the conciliation effort to be concluded in any 
definite period of time. The 180-day provision merely limits the right to bring a private 
action. Whereupon, if the plaintiff is not satisfied with the efforts of the EEOC, the plain­
tiff's right to bring an action does not arise until one hundred and eighty days after the 
charge has been filed with the EEOC. Id. 
50. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(I) (1982). The plaintiff must file a complaint in federal 
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Congress, in granting the EEOC the power to bring suit directly 
in federal court, preserved the employee's private right of action cre­
ated under Title VII.51 Under the provisions of section 706(f)(1), as 
amended, a potential litigant who has met the required charge filing 
deadlines52 may file a civil action with the appropriate federal district 
court within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue letter from the 
EEOC. 53 Under this subsection, the EEOC must notify the employee 
of his right to sue if the EEOC does not find reasonable cause, takes no 
action regarding the charge, or has not secured a conciliation agree­
ment that is acceptable to the agency within one hundred and eighty 
days after the charge is filed. 54 The ISO-day limitation provides that a 
complainant whose charge is not dismissed, promptly settled, or liti­
gated by the EEOC may bring a lawsuit, but must wait one hundred 
and eighty days before doing SO.55 After the one hundred and eighty 
days have passed, the aggrieved party may either file a private suit 
within ninety days after EEOC notification of right to sue or continue 
to leave the resolution of the charge to the efforts of the EEOC. 56 
B. National Policies and Priorities Reflected By Title VII 
Section 706(f)(1) is the heart of the Equal Employment Opportu­
district court within ninety days of receipt of the EEOC's statutory notice of the right to 
sue and not within ninety days of receipt of notice from the EEOC of the failure of concilia­
tion. In addition, the 90-day period runs from receipt and not issuance of the right-to-sue 
letter. See Lynn v. Western Gillette, Inc., 564 F.2d 1282, 1286 (9th Cir. 1977). 
51. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(I) (1982). 
52. Id. § 2000e-5(e). See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
53. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. A charging party has an unqualified right to obtain a right-to-sue letter from 
the EEOC after one hundred and eighty days from effective filing of a charge with the 
EEOC, regardless of whether the EEOC has completed its administrative process. 29 
C.F.R. § 1601.28(a) (1988). Upon receipt of the right-to-sue letter, the charging party has 
ninety days to file a court suit, in default of which the party is barred from bringing a Title 
VII action on the basis of the original charge . .See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 
U.S. 792, 798 (1973) (charging party's "receiving and acting upon the Commission's statu­
tory notice of the right to sue" is a "jurisdictional prerequisite" to Title VII suit). If, how­
ever, the charging party permits the. EEOC procedures to continue after the 180-day 
period, the 90-day period for commencing suit does not automatically start to run. Rather, 
the 90-day period is' triggered only by the receipt of the right-to-sue letter. It is generally 
true that there is no definite period within which the charging party is required to file suit 
in court up until the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter and starts the 90-day period running. 
See generally Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 517 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. de­
nied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976). 
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nity Act of 1972.57 The legislative history of section 706(f)(1) pro­
vides firm evidence that the purpose of this provision is to afford an 
aggrieved person the option of withdrawing a case from the EEOC if 
dissatisfied with the rate at which the charge is being processed. 58 
Both the House and Senate Reports expressly provide that the purpose 
of section 706(f)(I) is to give the charging party an option to circum­
vent extended EEOC delays resulting from the EEOC's burgeoning 
workload and insufficient resources. 59 
Specifically, in the House Report discussing the provisions of the 
bill, Congress recognized that the EEOC's workload was enormous, 
frequently causing administrative delays and frustrating the remedial 
character of the EEOC's actions. 6O Congress believed that granting 
the employee the private right to sue would best alleviate the "admin­
istrative quagmire" that often developed.61 
The Senate Report also explained that this provision became nec­
essary because the EEOC's heavy caseload could result in delays una,c­
ceptable to aggrieved persons: 
As it indicated in testimony, [the EEOC's] caseload has increased at 
57. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(I) (1982). For the text of section 706(f)(I), see supra 
note 4. 
58. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2137,2147-48. 
59. [d. See also S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 23, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972 410, 432 (1972). 
60. 	 H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& 	ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2147. Specifically, the House Report stated: 
In recent years regulatory agencies have been submerged with increasing work­
loads which strain their resources to the breaking point. The Commission has 
stated, in testimony before this committee, that its caseload has increased even 
more rapidly than its projections had anticipated. The result of this increasing 
use of many of the Federal regulatory agencies has frequently affected those agen­
cies' abilities to remain current on all of the matters for which they are responsi­
ble. This has led to lengthy delays in the administrative process and has 
frequently frustrated the remedial role of the agency. 
[d. Congress believed that granting the private plaintiff the right to sue is appropriate 
where the delay is occasioned by administrative inefficiencies. [d. at 13, reprinted in 1972 
U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 2148. 
61. 	 [d. at 12-13, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 2147-48. 
The House Report stated: 
In the case of the Commission, the burgeoning workload, accompanied by insuffi­
cient funds and a shortage of staff, has, in many instances, forced a party to wait 2 
to 3 years before final conciliation procedures can be instituted. This situation 
leads the committee to believe that the private right of action, both under the 
present Act and in the bill, provides the aggrieved party a means by which he may 
be able to escape from the administrative quagmire which occasionally surrounds 
a case caught in an overloaded administrative process. . 
[d. at 12, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 2147-48. 
248 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11 :235 
a rate which surpasses its own projections. The result has been in­
creasing backlogs in making determinations, and the possibility of 
occasional hasty decisions, made under the press of time, which 
have unfairly prejudiced complaints. Accordingly, where the Com­
mission is not able to pursue a complaint with satisfactory speed, or 
enters into an agreement which is not acceptable to the aggrieved 
party, the bill provides that the individual shall have an opportunity 
to seek his own remedy, even though he may have originally sub­
mitted his charge to the Commission. 62 
Despite its support for the private right to sue, the Sen~te Report ex­
pressed the preference "that recourse to this remedy will be the excep­
tion and not the rule."63 
Ultimately, both Houses concluded that the retention of the pri­
vate right of action was designed to provide the aggrieved person with 
an option to pursue a prompt remedy through the EEOC's admini­
strative proceedings or through a private action.64 In addition, the 
Conference Report for both Houses declared that the EEOC's admin­
istrative resolution of claims is the legislatively preferred method of 
handling employment discrimination claims and that the priority of 
Title VII is to protect the aggrieved person's option to seek a quick 
and effective remedy in the best manner available.65 
The legislative history of section 706(f)(1) demonstrates that an 
aggrieved person, unwilling to await the termination of lengthy EEOC 
administrative proceedings, may request a right-to-sue letter one hun­
dred and eighty days after a charge has been filed with the EEOC and 
62. S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 23, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972 410, 432 (1972). 
63. Id. 
64. A section-by-section analysis presented to both Houses in the Conference Report 
provides the final and conclusive meaning of section 706(f)(I): 
. The retention of the private right of action, as amended, ... is designed to make 
sure that the person aggrieved does not have to endure lengthy delays if the Com­
mission ... does not act with due diligence and speed. Accordingly, the provi­
sions ... allow the person aggrieved to elect to pursue his or her own remedy 
under this title in the courts where there is agency inaction, dalliance or dismissal 
of the charge, or unsatisfactory resolution. 
118 CONGo REC. 7166, 7168 (Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 - Conference 
Report); 118 CONGo REC. 7563, 7565 (Conference Report on H.R. 1746, The Equal Em­
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972). 
65. Id. 
It is hoped that recourse to the private lawsuit will be the exception and not the 
rule, and that the vast majority of complaints will be handled through the offices 
of the EEOC .... However, as the individual's rights to redress are paramount 
under the provisions of Title VII it is necessary that all avenues be left open for 
quick and effective relief. 
Id. 
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may institute a private lawsuit within ninety days of receipt of the 
right-to-sue letter.66 If the party prefers, however, section 706(f)(1) 
provides that an aggrieved party may await the termination of EEOC 
proceedings before initiating a private action.67 Neither section 
706(f)(1) nor any other section of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
explicitly requires the EEOC to conclude its conciliation efforts within 
any maximum period of time.68 
II. THE COURT'S DISCRETIONARY POWER To LOCATE A JUST 

RESULT IN THE CONTEXT OF TITLE VII 

There are no statutory limitations facing Title VII claimants 
awaiting EEOC action under section 706(f)(1).69 The courts, how­
ever, have had to decide whether equitable considerations affect a Title 
VII claimant's decision to indefinitely delay bringing suit until comple: 
tion of lengthy EEOC proceedings. Cases indicate that equitable con­
siderations have influenced the Supreme Court when it considered 
claims under Title VII. 
In Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, the Supreme Court upheld 
the timeliness of an EEOC Title VII enforcement suit charging dis­
crimination in employment on the basis of sex and held that the 180­
day limitation provision of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(I) is not a statutory 
limitation on the right of the EEOC to bring an action after the expira­
tion of one hundred and eighty days from the filing of a charge.7o In 
66. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e·5(f)(1) (1982). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(e), (f)(I) (1982). The sole limitation period on Title VII 
claims is embodied in Title VII's own time limits on filing charges and giving notice to the 
employer. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. A Title VII claimant must file a 
claim with the EEOC within one hundred and eighty days after the allegedly discrimina­
tory act occurred. Id. § 2000e-5(e). Once EEOC proceedings 'have terminated and the 
agency issues its right-to-sue letter, the claimant has ninety days to file suit in federal court. 
Id. § 2000e-5(f)(I). If, however, the EEOC proceedings are still in progress, a claimant 
may request a right-to-sue letter one hundred and eighty days after the filing of the charge. 
Id. This 180-day provision is not a statute of limitations. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. 
EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 361 (1977). Rather, "it simply provides that a complainant whose 
charge is not dismissed or promptly settled or litigated by the EEOC may himself bring a 
lawsuit, but that he must wait 180 days before doing so." Id. 
70. 432 U.S. 355 (1977). In Occidental, an employee of Occidental Life Insurance 
Company filed a Title VII sex discrimination claim with the EEOC on March 9, 1971. 
After investigation, the EEOC served proposed findings of fact on Occidental. Conciliation 
attempts between the EEOC and Occidental began in the summer of 1972 and continued 
sporadically into 1973. On September 13, 1973, the EEOC determined that the conciliation 
efforts had failed and notified both Occidental and the employee. The employee requested 
the case be referred to the EEOC to bring an enforcement action. On February 22, 1974, 
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addition, the Court acknowledged the procedural safeguards in the 
EEOC regulations,71 but found it "possible that despite these proce­
dural protections a defendant in a Title VII enforcement action might 
still be significantly handicapped in making his defense because of an 
inordinate EEOC delay in filing the action ...."72 In the event of an 
unexcused delay by the EEOC, the Court suggested that federal courts 
exercise their discretionary73 power "to locate 'a just result' in light of 
more than three years after the claim was filed with the EEOC and five months after EEOC 
conciliation efforts had failed, the EEOC filed suit. Id. at 357-58. 
The district court granted Occidental's motion for summary judgment on the ground 
that the enforcement action was time barred by § 706(f)(1) of the Act, since the action had 
not been brought within one hundred and eighty days of the formal filing of the charge with 
the EEOC. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed on the ground that 
§ 706(f)(I) imposes no limitation upon the EEOC's power to file suit in federal court. Id. 
at 358. 
In Occidental, the Supreme Court acknowledged Congress' expressed "concern for the 
need of time limitations in the fair operation of the Act," but noted that Congress' "con­
cern was directed entirely to the initial filing of a charge with the EEOC and prompt notifi­
cation thereafter to the alleged violator." Id. at 371. The Court affirmed the court of 
appeals' decision holding that the provisions of § 706(f)(I) and the legislative history 
showed that it was intended to enable an aggrieved person unwilling to await the conclu­
sion of extended EEOC proceedings to institute a private lawsuit one hundred and eighty 
days after a charge has been filed. The Court further determined that nothing in the sub­
section indicated that the EEOC's enforcement powers ceased if the aggrieved person de­
cided to leave the case in the hands of the EEOC rather than pursuing a private action. Id. 
at 361-73. "[N]either § 706(f) nor any other section of the Act explicitly requires the 
EEOC to conclude its conciliation efforts and bring an enforcement suit within any maxi­
mum period of time." Id. at 360. . 
71. Id. at 358-73. The EEOC regulations require that a charge be filed with the 
EEOC within one hundred and eighty days of the alleged discriminatory act. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(e) (1982). In addition, the alleged violator must be notified of the charge within 
ten days thereafter. Id. See also 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(b). Moreover, regulations promul­
gated by the EEOC require that the charged party be notified when a determination of 
reasonable cause has been made, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21(a), (b) (1988), and when the EEOC 
has terminated its efforts to conciliate a dispute. Id. § 1601.25. In effect, "during the pen­
dency of EEOC administrative proceedings, a potential defendant is kept informed of the 
progress of the action." Occidental, 432 U.S. at 372. 
72. Id. at 373. In Occidental, the Court realized that the absence of time limitations 
on the bringing of lawsuits might ultimately result in prejudice to the employer in making a 
defense. Id. In such a case, the Court asserted that "the federal courts do not lack the 
power to provide relief." Id. Specifically, the Court suggested that when prejudice to the 
employer does result, "the trial court may restrict or even deny backpay relief." Id. (citing 
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424-25 (1975». 
73. Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541 (1931). In Langnes, the Court stated that: 
The term 'discretion' denotes the absence of a hard and fast rule. When invoked 
as a guide to judicial action it means a sound discretion, that is to say, a discretion 
exercised not arbitrarily or wilfully, but with regard to what is right and equitable 
under the circumstances and the law, and directed by the reason and conscience 
of the judge to a just result. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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the circumstances peculiar to the case. "74 
One equitable consideration available to courts acting in their dis­
cretion is the doctrine of laches. 75 Laches is an equitable doctrine 
which is frequently termed the "doctrine of stale demand."76 The 
doctrine of laches may be defined generally as a rule of equity by 
which equitable relief is denied to one who has been guilty of uncon­
scionable delay, as shown by surrounding facts and circumstances, in 
seeking that relief. 77 Specifically, laches has been defined as "neglect 
or omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time of 
more or less duration, and other circumstances causing prejudice to an 
adverse party, as will operate as a bar in a court of equity."78 
A.' 	 The Doctrine of Laches As A Means Of Providing Equitable 
ReliefFrom The Prosecution OfStale Claims 
Although Occidental does not specifically mention the equitable 
doctrine of laches by name, the allusion seems unmistakable since the 
case holds that there is no statute of limitations on EEOC enforcement 
suits.79 In Occidental, the Supreme Court refused to impose a time 
limitation on the power of the EEOC to file suit in a federal court. 
The Court acknowledged, however, that the absence of such a time 
limitation may result in prejudice to a Title VII defendant due to an 
inordinate EEOC delay. Therefore, the Court held that the trial 
courts possess the discretionary power to provide relief in particular 
cases where the defendant is in fact prejudiced by the unexcused 
delay.80 
The equitable doctrine of laches is premised upon the same prin­
ciple that underlies statutes of limitations. This prinCiple includes the 
desire to avoid unfairness that can result from the prosecution of stale 
74. Occidental, 432 U.S. at 373 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 
405; 4i4-25 (1975». 
75.. Another such equitable consideration available to courts acting in their discre­
tion is the granting and denial of back pay. See infra notes 181-98 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of the back pay remedy. 
76. See Mexican Nat'l Coal, Timber & Iron Co. v. Frank, 154 F. 217, 236 (C.C.S.D. 
Tex. 1907) (quoting McCampbell v. Durst, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 522, 535,40 S.W. 315, 322 
(1897»; Johnson v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., 159 F. Supp. 104, 126 (W.D. La. 
1958) (quoting 19 AM. JUR. Equity §§ 489-509 at 352 (1939». 
77. Annotation, Laches As Precluding Cancellation ofor Other ReliefAgainst Release 
forPersonal Injuries, 34 A.L.R.2d 1314 (1954). 
78. 	 Freymark v. Handke, 415 Ill. 360, 366, 114 N.E.2d 349, 352 (1953). 
79.. Occidental, 432 U.S. at 361. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the Occidental decision. 
80. 	 Id. at 373. 
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claims. 81 The application oflaches, however, departs from the opera­
tion of statutes of limitations in that laches is more flexible and de­
pends upon equitable circumstances rather than on delay alone. 82 
Where there has been no inexcusable or unreasonable delay in seeking 
a remedy and/or the defendant has not been prejudiced by the mere 
passage of time, there is no reason to deny relief. Thus, the application 
of laches is left to the court's discretion.83 Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly emphasized "[t]hat no arbitrary or fixed period 
of time has been, or will be, established as an inflexible rule, but that 
the delay which will defeat such a suit must in every case depend on 
the peculiar equitable circumstances of that case."84 
As a result of the application of the doctrine of laches, a case may 
ultimately be dismissed before the merits of the plaintiff's claim are 
reached. Courts agree, however, that the judicial system was desigqed 
"not only to right wrongs, but to do so fairly and equitably."85 
B. 	 The Defense Of Laches As An Equitable Time Limitation On A 
Title VII Claimant's Right To Bring Suit 
To sustain the defense of laches two elements must be shown: 
first, an unreasonable or inexcusable delay on the part of the plaintiff 
81. 	 Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282-83 (1961). See also Randolph's Ex'r. 
v. Quidnick Co., 135 U.S. 457 (1890). In equity, a demand must be made within a reason­
able time or the claim is considered stale, and courts of equity refuse their aid to stale 
demands where the party has slept on his/her rights. See Urquhart v. McDonald, 252 Ala. 
505,509,42 So. 2d 9, 13 (1949); Sampson v. Cottongim, 249 Ky. 670, 671, 61 S.W.2d 309, 
310 (1933); Burns v. Dillon, 226 Ky. 82, 88, 9 S.W.2d 1095, 1098 (1928). 
82. Unlike a statutory period of limitation, laches is not a mere matter of elapsed 
time, but is principally a question of the inequity of permitting the claim to be enforced. 
Delay, although an important consideration in determining whether relief will be barred in 
equity because of laches, is not decisive. See Archambault v. Sprouse, 215 S.c. 336, 55 
S.E.2d 70 (1949). Lapse of time is only one of the elements to be considered in determini.ng 
the existence and application of laches as a defense in a suit of equity. See Finucane v. 
Hayden, 86 Idaho 199, 206, 384 P.2d 236, 240 (1963) (Lapse of time is an element but not 
the controlling factor of laches.). 
83. The determination of whether the doctrine of laches should be applied proceeds 
in light of the circumstances of the particular case before the court and according to right 
and justice. What might be inexcusable delay in one case might not be inconsistent with 
diligence in another. See Alsop v. Riker, 155 U.S. 448, 461 (1894) (length of time which 
must pass in order to show laches varies with the peculiar circumstances of each case); 
Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U.S. 224 (1892); Jackson v. Stevenson, 156 Mass. 496, 501, 31 
N.E. 691, 693 (1892) ("Whether the right to equitable relief is affected by acquiescence 
depends upon the circumstances of each case."); Bowen v. Hamilton, 393 P.2d 858 (Okla. 
1964). 
84. 	 The Key City, 81 U.S. 653, 660 (1871). 
85. 	 EEOC v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 641 F. S,upp. liS, 127-28 (S.D. Ind. 1986). 
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in bringing suit; and second, undue prejudice to the defendant. 86 
These elements are conjunctive, and, since laches is considered an af­
firmative defense, the burden of establishing both is on the 
defendant.87 
Since the Occidental 88 decision, a majority of courts have held 
that Title VII suits are subject to the doctrine of laches.89 Addition­
ally, the doctrine of laches has been applied to Title VII lawsuits both 
when the EEOC is suing on behalf of the charging party90 and when 
the charging party is suing as plaintiff.91 
86. Goodman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 446 U.S. 913 (1980). In general, a suit is held to be barred by the doctrine oflaches 
where the following factors are present: 1) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the 
complainant having had knowledge or notice of the, defendant's conduct and having been 
afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; and 2) injury or prejUdice to the defendant in the 
event relief is accorded to the complainant or the suit is not held to be barred. See also 
Johnson v. Delony, 241 Ala. 16, 1 So. 2d 11 (1941); Aronovitch v. Levy, 238 Minn. 237, 
242,56 N.W.2d 570, 574 (1953) ("The doctrine of laches is an equitable doctrine intended 
to prevent one who has not been diligent in asserting a known right from recovering at the 
expense of one who has been prejudiced by the delay."). 
87. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) provides that "[i]n pleading to a preceding pleading, a party 
shall set forth affirmatively ... laches, ... and any other matter constituting an avoidance 
or affirmative defense." 
88. 432 U.S. 355 (1977). See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text. 
89. See, e.g., Garrett v. General Motors Corp., 844 F.2d 559 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ­
109 S. Ct. 259 (1988); Cleveland Newspaper Guild, Local 1 v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 
839 F.2d 1147, 1153 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 245 (1988); Whitfield V. Anheuser­
Busch, Inc., 820 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1987); Waddell V. Small Tube Products, Inc., 799 F.2d 
69 (3d Cir. 1986); Jeffries V. Chicago Transit Auth., 770 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 475 U.S. 1050 (1986); Brown v. Continental Can Co., 765 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1985); 
Boone v. Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1979); Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 
596 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 452 U.S. 89 (1981). 
90. The applicability of the laches doctrine to Title VII actions when the EEOC is 
suing was established by EEOC v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 622 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1980). In 
Massey-Ferguson, the court found that the EEOC's enforcement suit was unreasonably 
delayed, and it remanded for a determination of the employer'S prejudice. Id. at 273. The 
court stated that although Title VII imposes no express limitation on the time within which 
the EEOC may bring a suit, the EEOC may be barred by laches from filing a suit. Id. at 
275. Recourse to the doctrine of laches is appropriate, the court said, if the EEOC has 
"unduly, inexcusably, unreasonably, or inordinately delayed in asserting a claim," and if 
that delay has "substantially, materially, or seriously prejudiced" the defendant's ability to 
conduct the defense. Id. 
See also EEOC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 668 F.2d 1199, 1200 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating 
that the "tortoise-like" speed with which the EEOC had handled the suit had "cost it the 
race"); EEOC V. Alioto Fish Co., 623 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1980); EEOC V. Radiator Specialty 
Co., 610 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1979) (acknowledging the applicability of the doctrine of laches 
to Title VII claims, but rejecting the laches defense under the particular circumstances of 
the case); EEOC v. Nicholson File Co., 408 F. Supp. 229 (D. Conn. 1976). 
91. The applicability of the laches doctrine to Title VII actions when the charging 
party is suing as plaintiff has been similarly established in Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 
F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 452 U.S. 89 (1981). In Bernard, the court acknowledged 
o 
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The principle that Title VII suits are subject to the equitable doc­
trine of laches does not mean that delay in the processing of a claim 
necessarily leads to the doctrine being applied. As stated above, to 
apply laches to a Title VII case, the defendant must satisfy the court 
on both prongs of the two-prong laches test. 92 Specifically, the defend-
that the doctrine of laches is applicable to Title VII actions brought by private plaintiffs, 
but that plaintiff's failure to file a Title VII claim until completion of the EEOC process 
was not inexcusable delay and could not support the application of laches to the particular 
facts of the case. Id. at 1256. . 
See also Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 458 F. Supp: 314 (W.D.N.C. 1978); 
Fannie v. Chamberlain Mfg. Corp., Derry Div., 445 F. Supp. 65 (W.D. Pa. 1977). 
92. In particular instances where the defense of laches has succeeded in barring a 
Title VII claim, courts have found that the plaintiff's delay was both unreasonable and 
prejudicial to the defendant. EEOC v. Liberty Loan Corp., 584 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1978). 
In Liberty Loan, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held an EEOC administrative delay 
of four years and four months to be unreasonable and upheld the district court's grant of 
summary judgment for the defendant based on its finding of sufficient prejudice. Id. at 857­
58. The court found that under the circumstances presented, the delay was not only inordi­
nately long, but was caused in part by the agency's unexplained failure to properly conduct 
its investigation. Id. at 857. 
Concerning the prejudice resulting from the delay, the court found that prejudice to 
the employer existed, even assuming that relevant records could be located. This prejudice 
was due to the hardship in locating former employees and procuring their testimony. Id. at 
858. In its finding, the court noted that of the one hundred and forty-five persons employed 
with the company during the relevant period, only five were still so employed. In addition, 
the supervisors familiar with the employee were no longer employed by the company nor 
were any persons responsible for the company's personnel policies and practices during 
that relevant time period. Finally, noting that the company had also undergone a reorg~ni­
zation, the court found that the employer was now an essentially different company from 
that which allegedly discriminated against the employee. Id. at 855. It would be grossly 
unfair, the court concluded, to require the employer to spend large amounts of time and 
money to locate former employees and records in order to defend an essentially moot law­
suit which was unreasonably delayed by the EEOC. Id. at 858. See also Fridy v. Moultrie, 
595 F. Supp. 34 (D.D.C. 1984). 
Conversely, where the doctrine of laches has failed to bar a Title VII claim, courts 
have found, under the particular facts and circumstances of a case, that the equitable de­
fense of laches was not established or supportable. Specifically, courts have found that 
plaintiff's delay in bringing suit was not unreasonable or inexcusable, and/or that the de­
fendant was not prejudiced as a result of the delay. In Askins v. Imperial Reading Corp., 
420 F. Supp. 413 (W.D. Va. 1976), the United States District Court for the Western Dis­
trict of Virginia held that laches did not apply to a Title VII action brought by private 
plaintiffs more than four years after the filing of an employment discrimination claim with 
the EEOC because it was not shown that prejudice had resulted to the defendant. In As­
kins, each of the named plaintiffs filed a race and sex discrimination charge with the EEOC 
in May, 1971. The EEOC commenced an investigation at that time and subsequently is­
sued letters of determination in February, 1974. Thereafter, the EEOC and Imperial en­
tered into conciliation discussions. Conciliation efforts continued unsuccessfully through 
August, 1974, whereupon the EEOC invited plaintiffs to request a right-to-sue letter. 
Plaintiffs promptly filed their requests; however, the EEOC delayed issuing the right-to-sue 
letters until November, 1975. Plaintiffs commenced their Title VII class action lawsuit in 
February, 1975. While noting that the EEOC's delay in this case meant that the court 
sitting in 1976 would be adjudicating claims reaching back to 1969 with evidence adduced 
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ant must establish that the delay was inexcusable or unreasonable93 
and resulted in undue prejudice to the defendant's ability to defend the 
case on the merits. 94 One court stated that, in its determination, a 
court should examine "the length of the delay, the reasons therefor, 
reaching even further into the past, the court determined that "in the absence of specific 
prejudice to the Defendant," the court could not penalize Title VII plaintiffs for any delay. 
Id. at 416. The court acknowledged, however, that as the action progressed the defense of 
laches may, if appropriate, be applied in any relief granted. Id. "This is not to say that as 
this action progresses, the doctrine oflaches may not, if appropriate, be applied in any relief 
granted." Id. See also Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 550 F. Supp. 204 (N.D. Ga. 1982). 
93. Where laches is argued as a defense to a Title VII claim, the determination of 
whether the delay of a plaintiff is inexcusable or unreasonable is closely related to whether 
the defendant suffered prejudice from the delay. Gull Airborne Instruments, Inc. v. Wein­
berger, 694 F.2d 838, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In Weinberger, the court stated that where the 
delay is a short period of time, the magnitude of prejudice required is great; if the delay is 
lengthy, prejudice is more likely to have occurred and less proof of the prejudice will be 
necessary. Id. (quoting Goodman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800, 807 (8th 
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913 (1980». 
In Title VII cases where the private plaintiff delays in bringing suit, some courts con­
sider the nature of the EEOC's administrative activity and conciliation efforts on behalf of 
the plaintiff in their determination of "unreasonableness." For example, the courts in the 
following cases held that lengthy delays by private plaintiffs in bringing Title VII actions 
were reasonable where the plaintiffs awaited the outcome of the EEOC administrative pro­
cess and ·EEOC efforts on behalf of the plaintiffs were active and continuing: Holsey v. 
Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 (1985); Howard v. 
Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1984); Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & 
Tel. Co., 458 F. Supp. 314 (W.D.N.C. 1978). Alternatively, where the EEOC has been 
characterized as dormant in processing the private plaintiff's Title VII claim, the following 
courts considered the plaintiff's delay in bringing court action unreasonable: Jeffries v. 
Chicago Transit Auth., 770 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050 (1986); 
Boone v. Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th CiT. 1979); Lynn v. Western Gil­
lette, Inc., 564 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1977). 
The courts recognize, however, that the nature of the EEOC's activity is but one factor 
to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of the plaintiff's own delay, and the deter­
mination must be made in consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's 
~ctions. See Cleveland Newspaper Guild, Local I v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 839 F.2d 
1147, 1153-54 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 245 (1988). 
94. Where laches is argued as a defense to a Title VII claim, the prejudice suffered by 
the defendant will usually consist of the unavailability of witnesses, changes in work force 
and personnel structure, and loss of records occasioned by the plaintiff's delay in bringing 
suit. See Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1980); Boone v. Mechanical 
Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th CiT. 1979). 
In Jones, the court, in analyzing possible prejudice to the defendant occasioned by a 
Title VII plaintiff's more than nine year delay in bringing suit. emphasized that defendant's 
personnel directors had changed and employees familiar with the facts had long since de­
parted. In addition, the court noted that the individuals still employed had only vague 
memories of events which transpired more than nine years prior to the filing of the lawsuit, 
and files of possibly great importance were no longer available. Jones, 614 F.2d at 1390, 
n.\. 
In Boone, in which a Title VII plaintiff delayed seven years before bringing suit, the 
court found the defendant's showing that missing witnesses were unavailable to testify and 
that state unemployment compensation appeal files relating to plaintiff's discharge from 
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how the delay affected the defendant, and the overall fairness of per­
mitting the assertion of the claim."95 
Each court to consider the specific issue of the applicability of the 
laches doctrine to bar a Title VII action agrees, at least in theory, that 
laches may be applied as an equitable time limitation on a Title VII 
claimant's right to bring suit.96 Questions arise, however, as to the 
application of the defense of laches in particular circumstances. Spe­
cifically, when a private plaintiff timely files a Title VII action in fed­
eral court, after waiting for the conclusion of the EEOC 
administrative process and within ninety days after receiving a right­
to-sue letter, the question then arises when and under what circum­
stances does the delay of the private plaintiff in filing suit give rise to 
the equitable defense of laches. More particularly, when and under 
what circumstances does the delay become "unreasonable" or "inex­
cusable" so as to satisfy the first prong of the two-prong laches test. 
The next section of this comment examines the disagreement among 
the federal courts of appeals' decisions which have considered the ap­
plicability of the doctrine of laches under these circumstances. 
III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE RESOLUTION OF TITLE VII CLAIMS 

VERSUS THE INDEFINITE TOLLING OF CLAIMS 

Against the backdrop of cases which have applied the doctrine of 
laches in the context of Title VII97 and in light of the provisions in 
employment were no longer available dispositive of the prejudice issue. Boone, 609 F.2d at 
959. 
In addition to the prejudice discussed above, resulting from the unavailability of wit­
nesses and changes in personnel, is the prejudice to the employer resulting from the accrual 
of potential back pay liability. If Title VII claims are litigated in a timely fashion the 
employer's potential liability ceases to accrue. Conversely, if the Title VII plaintiff waits 
until the completion of the EEOC proceedings before filing suit, the delay which may result 
could substantially and unfairly enlarge the employer's back pay liability. This increased 
monetary liability constitutes an additional element of prejudice in a laches defense. See 
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Elec., 
Inc., 603 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1060 (1981); Lynn v. Western 
Gillette, Inc., 564 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1977). See infra notes 191-96 for a discussion of the 
Lynn and Kamberos cases. 
95. Goodman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800,806 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 446 U.S. 913 (1980). 
96. See generally Jeffries v. Chicago Transit Auth., 770 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050 (1986); Rozen V. District of Columbia, 702 F.2d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 
1983); Boone V. Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1979); Bernard V. Gulf 
Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 452 U.S. 89 (1981). 
97. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977). See supra notes 69-74 
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Occidental decision. EEOC v. Liberty Loan 
Corp., 584 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1978). See supra note 92 for a discussion of the Liberty Loan 
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section 706(f)(1)98 that permit a private plaintiff to await the termina­
tion of EEOC proceedings before filing suit, the federal courts of ap­
peals have disagreed on the specific application of equitable principles 
to Title VII cases. Particularly, courts disagree on whether the appli­
cation of equitable principles permits a dismissal based on laches when 
a private plaintiff chooses to await the completion of lengthy EEOC 
~roceedings before filing suit in federal court and the defendant em­
ployer proves undue prejudice as a result of plaintiff's delay. Under 
these circumstances, courts have had to decide whether it is "unrea­
sonable" or "inexcusable," pursuant to a laches defense, for a private 
plaintiff to delay filing suit until the EEOC has made its determination 
and issued the plaintiff a right-to-sue letter. These questions raise two 
competing concerns: first, concern for the EEOC's administrative res­
olution of Title VII claims under section 706(f)(1), as the legislatively 
preferred method for achieving the goal of equality of employment 
opportunities; and second, the resulting indefinite tolling of a Title VII 
claim to the prejudice of the defendant. 
A. Ad Hoc Determinations 
The arguments on each side of the laches issue are compelling. A 
Title VII plaintiff asserts both a statutory right to await the comple­
tion of the EEOC administrative process before filing suit99 and the 
congressional policy of favoring reliance on the administrative pro­
ceedings. loo A Title VII defendant looks to the equitable doctrine of 
laches to protect himselflherself from prejudice by the prosecution of 
stale claims. 101 Both the plaintiff and defendant assert viable and sup­
portable reasons for their respective positions. Neither party, how­
ever, is so clearly entitled to a decision that it could be said that as a 
matter of law the decision should be made in hislher favor. 
The United States Courts of Appeals for the SeventhlO2 and 
decision. Askins v. Imperial Reading Corp., 420 F. Supp. 413 (W.D. Va. 1976). See supra 
note 92 for a discussion of the Askins decision. 
98. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(I) (1982). See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of § 706(f)(I). 
99. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(I) (1982). 
100. See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the congres­
sional policies reflected in § 706(f)( 1). 
101. See supra notes 75-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the develop­
ment of the doctrine of laches as a defense to Title VII claims. 
102. See Jeffries v. Chicago Transit Auth., 770 F.2d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 475 U.S. 1050 (1986) (relying on the administrative process of the EEOC cannot 
excuse a delay of over ten years in asserting a Title VII claim). 
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Eighth103 Circuits have addressed the precise issue and have taken a 
classic laches approach. These courts have qeld that a private plaintiff 
does not have an absolute right to await te'rmination of EEOC pro­
ceedings where an unreasonable or inexcusable delay has prejudiced 
the defendant employer. These courts accept the defense of laches, 
based on the facts of each case, as an equitable time limitation on the 
private plaintiff's right to file suit in federal court. 
In sharp contrast, the Fourth,I04 Fifth,105 Sixth,106 Ninth,107 
Eleventh,108 and District of Columbia109 Circuits have generally held 
that a plaintiff's failure to file a Title VII lawsuit until completion of 
the EEOC process is not inexcusable or unreasonable delay and, there­
fore, cannot support the application of laches. To the contrary, these 
courts generally grant the private plaintiff the presumption that the 
plaintiff is entitled to await the completion of EEOC proceedings 
before filing suit in federal court. 1 10 Despite recognizing that the doc­
103. See Garrett v. General Motors Corp., 844 F.2d 559, 561 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
109 S. Ct. 259 (1988) ("doctrine of laches is a proper defense in a Title VII action"). See 
also Whitfield v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 820 F.2d 243, 245 (8th Cir. 1987) (ten year delay in 
filing suit was inexcusable). 
104. See Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199,211 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 
470 U.S. 1028 (1985) (charging party's "decision to rely on the [EEOC's] administrative 
process before initiating a private suit is not inexcusable delay"). 
105. See Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249, 1257 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 452 
U.S. 89 (1981) ("[p]laintiff's failure to file their Title VII claim until completion of the 
EEOC process was not inexcusable delay and could not support the application of laches"). 
106. See Cleveland Newspaper Guild, Local I v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 839 
F.2d 1147, 1153 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 245 (1988) ("[I]n rare cases, the only 
avenue for relieving unfair prejudice to the defendant is dismissal of the plaintiff's claim. "). 
107. See Brown v. Continental Can Co., 765 F.2d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1985) ("EEOC 
delays are not to be charged against private plaintiffs and ... complainants are not required 
to terminate the administrative process by requesting a notice of right-to-sue. "). See also 
Gifford v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 685 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Ordinarily, if 
the EEOC retains control over a charge, a private plaintiff will not be charged with its 
mistakes. "). 
But see Boone v. Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956, 960 (9th Cir. 1979). In 
Boone, the court acknowledged that "[t]he Act clearly encourages informal conciliation of 
grievances through the offices of the EEOC. Nevertheless, we cannot read Title VII as 
providing for the indefinite tolling of a claim which knowingly lies dormant with the 
EEOC, to the prejudice of the adversary party." Note, however, that the Boone court 
stated that this is "the exception and not the general rule." /d. 
108. See Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529, 1533 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(plaintiff's failure to file a Title VII claim until completion of the administrative processes 
of the EEOC was not inexcusable delay, and thus could not support the application of 
laches). 
109. See Rozen v. District of Columbia, 702 F.2d 1202, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (court 
of appeals disagreed with the district court's determination that a private plaintiff should be 
held responsible for the delay in the issuance of a right-to-sue letter). 
110. The Title VII defendant may attempt to rebut this presumption by offering evi­
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trine of laches may apply, these courts have shown a reluctance to 
dismiss Title VII suits on the ground of laches and have limited the 
defense to rare cases. III 
In each case, the threshold inquiry in deciding the laches issue, 
whether for the plaintiff or the defendant, is whether the plaintiff 
delayed unreasonably or inexcusably in filing suit in the district court. 
The circumstances militating for or against the application of the doc­
trine of laches vary among the courts. Generally, in determining the 
reasonableness of the plaintiff's delay, courts will consider not only 
the plaintiff's conduct, but also the EEOC's delay in proceeding, inso­
far as it bears on the reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct. I 12 
Thus, whether the circumstances of a particular case warrant the 
delay depends on the particular facts of each case; and since no specific 
length of time has been established by the courts as per se unreasona­
ble, the determination of reasonableness must be decided on an ad hoc 
basis.ll3 Accordingly, the respective decisions of the courts which 
have applied the laches doctrine illustrate the fact-dependent nature of 
dence of unr!!3Sonable delay on the part of the private plaintiff and resulting prejudice to 
the defendant in making a defense. The presumption courts, however, hold that the appli­
cation of the doctrine of laches barring Title VII claims is an exception and not the general 
rule. See infra notes 165-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of such a rare case. 
111. See Cleveland Newspaper Guild, Local I v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 839 
F.2d 1147 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 245 (1988); Boone v. Mechanical Specialties 
Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1979). 
112. See, e.g., Jeffries v. Chicago Transit Auth., 770 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 475 U.S. 1050 {I 986); Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 
452 U.S. 89 (l981). 
113. See Waddell v. Small Tube Products, Inc., 799 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1986). In Wad­
dell, a religious discrimination charge had been timely filed with the state deferral agency 
and the EEOC. Due to a misunderstanding, the EEOC did not pick up the case after the 
deferral agency dismissed the underlying charges. Even though the plaintiff wrote the 
EEOC twice requesting some action, the EEOC believed that the deferral agency still had 
jurisdiction and continued to defer. The plaintiff, in the meantime, received no response to 
his letters. Four and one-half years after the plaintiff's last letter to the EEOC, the misun­
derstanding was resolved, and the EEOC proceeded to issue a right-to-sue letter. The 
plaintiff then timely filed a lawsuit some six years after he first filed an administrative 
charge of discrimination. At the conclusion of a full trial, the district court found for the 
plaintiff. Small Tube appealed, contending that the district court's decision was clearly 
erroneous and that the court erred in failing to find Waddell's claim barred by the doctrine 
of laches as a matter of law. [d. at 71-74. 
After reviewing the circumstances of the case, the court of appeals concluded that, 
"although plaintiffs have some obligation to monitor the progress of their charge and do 
not have the absolute right to await termination of EEOC proceedings where it would 
appear to a reasonable person that no administrative resolution will be forthcoming, 
whether the circumstances warranted the delay in a particular case requires an ad hoc 
determination." [d. at 77. The circumstances in Waddell included his testimony that he 
did not know a charging party could secure a right-to-sue letter one hundred and eighty 
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the inquiry and the necessity for a reasoned exercise of discretion in 
their determinations. 
B. 	 Laches As An Avenue For Relieving Unfair Prejudice To The 
Title VII Defendant: The Classic Laches Approach 
The courts which have held that lengthy delays by private plain­
tiffs in bringing Title VII actions are "inexcusable" or "unreasonable" 
recognize the tremendous work load and overburdened staff of the 
EEOC, but reason that there must be a limit to the prejudice and in­
convenience that can be placed on a Title VII defendant because of the 
EEOC's inability to act promptly in processing a plaintiff's claim. 
These courts hold that a Title VII private plaintiff is not permitted to 
unduly prejudice and inconvenience the defendant by relying on the 
EEOC's slow process and the administrative resolution of employee 
claims. 114 
Contrary to the presumption that Title VII provides a private 
plaintiff with an unqualified right to await the conclusion of EEOC 
proceedings before filing suit,1I5 the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have 
held that Title VII does not countenance the type of delay which re­
sults in undue prejudice to the defendant's ability to defend the case on 
days after a charge was filed. Furthermore, he had a limited education and was not then 
represented by counsel. Id. . 
Although the court found the arguments on both sides of the laches question to have 
merit, under the circumstances, it concluded that the question was too close to be deter­
mined as a matter of fact, law, and discretion on appeal. The court remanded for "pivotal 
findings on whether Waddell's conduct was excusable and whether Small Tube suffered 
sufficient prejudice to warrant application of laches." Id. at 79. 
In addition to the issue of laches as a bar to commencement of the lawsuit, the court of 
appeals applied the doctrine of laches to the accrual of back pay. The trial court had ruled 
that a lack of diligence prejudiced the employer because back pay continued to mount even 
as the ability to defend decreased. The district court, therefore, tolled the back pay award 
for a four and one-half year period. Id. at 78. 
The appellate court found that "[j]ust as a decision on laches as a defense requires a 
finding whether Waddell's delay was excusable or not, so also does a decision that laches 
can be used to bar part of Waddell's back pay claim." Id. Although the court of appeals 
remanded the case for a finding of inexcusable delay, it stated its approval of an approach 
to laches which allowed the district courts to use a less draconian penalty than dismissal. 
Id. at 79. 
114. See, e.g., Garrett v. General Motors Corp., 844 F.2d 559 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
109 S. Ct. 259 (1988); Whitfield V. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 820 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1987); 
Jeffries V. Chicago Transit Auth., 770 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050 
(1986). 
115. See infra notes 146-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the courts of 
appeals which grant the Title VII private plaintiff the presumption that they are entitled to 
await the termination of EEOC proceedings before filing suit in federal court. 
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the merits. I 16 In support of their determination to allow the defense of 
laches to bar a Title VII claim in these instances, these courts point to 
the length of the delay, the extent of the loss of evidence in support of 
defendant's position, the unavailability of witnesses, and the notion 
that allowing the private plaintiff to unreasonably delay the filing of a 
Title VII claim may result in the prosecution of stale claims.117 
Garrett v. General Motors Corp., decided in 1988 by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and Jeffries v. Chicago 
Transit Auth., decided in 1985 by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit, represent the latest statements of these circuits 
on the question of the application of the defense of laches to bar a Title 
VII claim when a private plaintiff chooses to await the completion of 
lengthy EEOC proceedings before filing suit, and the defendant em­
ployer proves undue prejudice as a result of the delay. I IS The follow­
ing section discusses the classic laches approach and the rationales 
relied upon in Garrett and Jeffries by the Courts of Appeals for the 
Eighth and Seventh Circuits, respectively, in their decisions to apply 
the defense of laches to the Title VII claims in those instances. 
l. Garrett v. General Motors Corp. I 19 
In Garrett, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a pri­
vate plaintiff's fourteen and one-half year delay in filing a Title VII 
claim was unreasonable and inexcusable and that defendant's defense 
had been prejudiced as a result. 120 The plaintiff in Garrett filed a race 
discrimination charge with the EEOC in 1971. On July 22, 1985, the 
EEOC issued the plaintiff a right-to-sue letter and plaintiff filed suit in 
September, 1985. 121 
At trial, plaintiff claimed to have contacted the EEOC office on 
numerous occasions by phone and in person between 1972 and 1980. 
In addition, testimony indicated that in 1983 plaintiff was informed by 
the EEOC that the discrimination file had been destroyed. Although 
evidence was offered at trial to attempt to reconstruct the EEOC's 
processing of plaintiff's claims, the district court concluded that it was 
116. Garrett v. General Motors Corp., 844 F.2d 559 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. 
Ct. 259 (1988); Whitfield v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 820 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1987); Jeffries v. 
Chicago Transit Auth., 770 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050 (1986). 
117. Jeffries, 770 F.2d at 679-82; Whitfield, 820 F.2d at 245-46. 
118. Garrett v. General Motors Corp., 844 F.2d 559 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. 
Ct. 259 (1988); Jeffries v. Chicago Transit Auth., 770 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 
475 U.S. 1050 (1986). 
119. 844 F.2d 559 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 259 (1988). 
120. .Jd. at 561-62. 
121. Id. at 560-61. 
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difficult to determine how the claim was actually processed. 122 Based 
on its findings of fact, the district court found that plaintiff's "contact 
with the EEOG was minimal" and that plaintiff "did not actively pur­
sue his rights."'23 The district court concluded that plaintiff's claim 
was barred by the doctrine of laches as a matter of law. 124 
On appeal, plaintiff argued that a Title VII plaintiff's failure to 
file a civil suit until completion of the EEOC administrative process 
was not inexcusable and could not support the application of the 
laches defense. 125 The court of appeals, however, emphatically dis­
agreed. The court stated simply "that the doctrine of laches is a 
proper defense in a Title VII action, and may be used to bar a lawsuit 
where the plaintiff is guilty of (1) unreasonable and unexcused delay, 
(2) resulting in prejudice to the defendant."126 
In its determination, the court of appeals noted that the plaintiff's 
file was improperly processed by the EEOC and that the plaintiff was 
misinformed about the status of the case. 127 The court, however, also 
considered the fact that plaintiff's minimal contact with the EEOC 
and plaintiff's own delay caused prejudice to the defendant. 128 Based 
on these findings, the court of appeals held that it was within the dis­
trict court's discretion to apply the defense of laches under these 
circumstances. 129 
122. Id. 
123. Garrett v. General Motors Corp., 657 F. Supp. 1273, 1276 (E.D. Mo. 1987). 
124. Garrett, 844 F.2d at 561. . 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 562. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. See also Whitfield v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 820 F.2d 243 (8th CiT. 1987). 
In Whitfield, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dis­
missal of a plaintiff's Title VII claim on the ground of laches, where the plaintiff filed suit 
ten years after the claim was originally filed with the EEOC, but within the statutory time 
following issuance of the right-to-sue letter. Id. at 246. The court agreed with the district 
court's finding that the plaintiff unreasonably and inexcusably delayed infiljng suit and that 
the employer was prejudiced by the delay. Id. at 244. 
In Whitfield, the plaintiff filed a charge of race discrimination with the EEOC on 
January 17, 1973. Thereafter, the EEOC commenced an investigation of the charge and 
held a hearing in October, 1974. Following the hearing the claim remained dormant with 
the EEOC until the EEOC issued the plaintiff a right-to-sue letter in July, 1983. Within 
ninety days of receiving the right-to-sue letter, the plaintiff filed suit iri district court. Based 
on the depositions of two key defense witnesses who testified they could no longer recall the 
events which led to the decision to terminate the plaintiff, the defendant filed a motion for 
summary judgment based on laches. The district court granted the motion, ruling that the 
Title VII claim was barred by the doctrine of laches, and the plaintiff appealed. /d. 
In considering whether the case was a proper setting for the application of laches, the 
court of appeals applied both prongs of the two-prong laches defense. To determine the 
reasonableness of the delay, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered "both the 
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2. Jeffries v. Chicago Transit Auth.130 
In Jeffries, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a 
plaintiff's Title VII claim, which was timely filed with the EEOC in 
1974, was barred by the doctrine of laches. The court found that both 
elements of the laches defense were present. The court stated that the 
delay of over ten years in filing suit was inexcusable and the defendant 
was prejudiced by such delay through its destruction of relevant 
records. 131 
In Jeffries, the plaintiff filed a race discrimination charge with the 
EEOC on November 11, 1974. The defendant received notification of 
the charge and responded on December 17, 1974, denying the allega­
tion. Thereafter, the EEOC took no further action until June 9, 1982, 
when it informed the defendant of its reasonable cause determination. 
On July 28, 1982, the defendant requested reconsideration, which the 
EEOC denied on September 24, 1982. The EEOC issued a right-to­
sue letter to the employee on January 12, 1984, and on March 8, 1984, 
the plaintiff filed suit. \32 
The defendant moved for summary judgment based on the doc­
trine of laches. In support of this motion, defendant submitted affida­
vits indicating that several employees relevant to the defense had 
either retired or were no longer in defendant's employ and that rele­
vant employment and medical records had been destroyed as part of 
the defendant's regular retention-destruction schedule. The district 
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and the 
plaintiff appealed. 133 
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that it would be contrary to the 
policies reflected in Title VII to allow a claim to be barred by the 
defense of laches prior to the completion of the EEOC's administrative 
length of the delay and the plaintiff's reasons for the delay." [d. at 245. The court noted 
that the plaintiff made no attempts to check on the status of his claim with the EEOC after 
the October, 1974 hearing, and offered no meaningful explanation for his inaction. There­
fore, the court concluded that the ten year delay was unexcused. In addition, considering 
the facts of the case, the court also found the delay was unreasonable. As to the prejudice 
resulting from the ten year delay, the court of appeals agreed that the impaired recollection 
of the defendant's witnesses supported the finding of prejudice by the district court. [d. at 
246. Having satisfied both elements of a laches defense, the court concluded that the doc­
trine of laches was properly applied to bar the plaintiff's Title VII action in this case, even 
though the plaintiff filed suit within the statutory time period after the EEOC finally issued 
a right-to-sue letter. [d. at 245-46. 
130. 770 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1985), cerro denied, 475 U.S. 1050 (1986). 

13 \. [d. at 679-82. 

132. [d. at 678. 
133. [d. at 678-79. 
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process. 134 The court of appeals acknowledged the legislative and ju­
dicial desire to resolve most complaints through the EEOC's adminis­
trative process rather than litigation,135 but concluded that a plaintiff 
does not have an absolute right to await the termination of EEOC 
proceedings. 136 The court held that laches will bar a claim if the plain­
tiff inexcusably delays in asserting it and the defendant has been mate­
rially prejudiced as a result.137 
The court of appeals found that the defendant satisfied both ele­
ments of the laches defense. The court found that plaintiff's delay in 
filing suit was inexcusable and that the delay resulted in undue preju­
dice to the defendant. 138 In determining that the plaintiff's delay in 
this case was both unreasonable and inexcusable, the court relied on 
several factors including the apparent lack of activity on the plaintiff's 
part and the fact that plaintiff had counsel for one year.139 On the 
basis of these factors, the court concluded that the ten year delay was 
"manifestly" unreasonable and plaintiff's reliance on the EEOC's ad­
ministrative process was not excusable. l40 
The court further determined that the element of prejudice was 
clearly supported by the affidavits submitted by the defendant.141 On 
this point, plaintiff argued that the defendant could not be prejudiced 
by lack of records it destroyed or lost because it had a duty to retain 
134. Id. at 681. The plaintiff argued "that it would be antithetical to Congress' 'pre­
ferred' method of resolving Title VII claims if victims of discrimination could be guilty of 
laches for allowing the EEOC's administrative process to run its course before filing suit in 
federal court." Id. (citation omitted). 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 679-81. 
138. Id. at 679-82. 
139. Id. at 679-80. In finding that the plaintiff's delay was inexcusable, the court 
relied on these factors: 
1) [plaintiff] ... showed alacrity in filing the EEOC complaint ...; 
2) he had counsel for one year; 
3) he could not rule out that counsel had helped him with his EEOC claim; 
4) it should have been apparent that no administrative resolution was imminent 
long before 1982; 
5) he could have requested a right-to-sue letter; and 
6) he did nothing in the ten years between filing the charge and this suit. 
Id. In addition, the court took note of an affidavit submitted by the plaintiff indicating that 
he took no action because in 1975 certain EEOC agents advised him to do nothing about 
the case until he heard from the EEOC. Id. at 679. Regardless of plaintiff's affidavit, the 
court found that plaintiff's reliance on the EEOC could not excuse a delay of this length. 
Id. at 680. 
140. Id. at 680 ("[r]elying on the administrative process cannot excuse a delay of this 
length"). 
141. Id. 
265 1989] 	 LACHES AS A DEFENSE 
them under EEOC regulations. 142 The court, however, ruled that the 
regulations could not be read as requiring the defendant to maintain 
the records indefinitely, where the defendant had no notice of a contin­
uing obligation to retain them. 143 Specifically the court noted that the 
charge was filed in 1974, the defendant denied the charge, and then 
heard nothing for eight years. l44 
Based on the court's finding of inexcusable and unreasonable de­
lay by the plaintiff and prejudice to the defendant, the court concluded 
that the defendant had satisfied the requirements of the doctrine of 
laches. The court determined that the defendant had established inex­
cusable delay on the part of the employee and resulting prejudice as a 
matter of law. The court, therefore, affirmed the dismissal of the 
plaintiff's Title VII claim based on laches. 145 
The Garrett and Jeffries opinions best exemplify the decisions of 
the classic laches courts which seek to limit the prejudice and incon­
venience that can be placed upon a Title VII defendant because of the 
private plaintiff's statutory right to rely on the EEOC's administrative 
resolution of a Title VII claim. These courts characterize the doctrine 
of laches as a readily available avenue for relieving unfair prejudice to 
the defendant under these circumstances. 
C. 	 The Private Plaintiff's Right To Rely On The EEOC's 
Administrative Resolution Of Title VII Claims: The 
Presumption Courts 
The 	courts that grant the private plaintiff the presumption that 
142. [d. at 681. The EEOC requires employers, employment agencies, and labor 
organizations to make and preserve certain employment records and to make certain re­
ports concerning their employment activities and practices. The EEOC is empowered to 
impose such requirements by 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-8(c) (1982). In addition, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1602.14(a) (1988) requires an employer to keep employment records which are relevant 
to a Title VII discrimination charge until the date of expiration of the statutory period 
within which an action may be filed or, if an action is filed, on its termination date. The 
EEOC also requires an employer to keep for at least six months alI personnel records that 
are made. [d. The records that must be kept are those made in connection with job appli­
cants, hiring, promotion, demotion, transfer, layoffs, rates of pay, and other forms of com­
pensation. [d.. If an employee is discharged, the employer must keep his or her personnel 
record for six months from the date of discharge. [d. For the provisions of 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1602.14, see infra note 200. 
143. Jeffries, 770 F.2d at 681. See also Boone v. Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 
F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1979). The Boone court held that U[i]n the absence of any type of 
continuing administrative proceedings ... , we do not believe that Mechanical was under 
an affirmative obligation to prepare for a lawsuit which would be filed seven years after the 
incident giving rise to it occurred." [d. at 960 (footnote omitted). 
144. 	 Jeffries, 770 F.2d at 681. 
145. 	 [d. at 682. 
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they are entitled to indefinitely await the termination of the EEOC's 
administrative process generally find that it is reasonable for an ag­
grieved employee to allow the EEOC to retain jurisdiction over a Title 
VII action. The conviction to which these authorities give voice-that 
a Title VII plaintiff should not be penalized for pursuing administra­
tive avenues of relief-is premised on the strong federal policy which 
favors the avoidance of private suits by encouraging claimants to rely 
on the EEOC administrative procedures. In addition, these courts 
find that the Title VII remedial scheme would be frustrated were the 
defense of laches to be allowed. 146 These courts characterize the pri­
vate remedy allowed by Title VIII47 as an alternative method for pri­
vate plaintiffs to obtain relief from discrimination. In support of this 
contention, the courts point to the legislative analysis of the 1972 
amendment of Title VII as evidence of the strong federal policy favor­
ing reliance on the EEOC's resolution of disputes. 148 
Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 149 decided in 1979 by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and Howard v. Roadway Ex­
press, Inc.,lso decided in 1984 by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit, best illustrate the position of the courts 
which, as a general rule, grant the Title VII private plaintiff the pre­
146. As stated in Sangster v. United Air Lines, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 1221 (N.D. Cal. 
1977), aff'd, 633 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981): 
[Plaintiff's] reliance on the EEOC to conciliate her dispute with United can­
not be characterized as lack of diligence on her part in view of the strong federal 
policy favoring such reliance. She cannot be found chargeable with neglect which 
would bar her right to bring this action when, trusting in the good offices and 
promise of her government to seek resolution of her complaint, she commits that 
grievance to its care . 
. . . EEOC's conciliation efforts, "regardless of the time taken," are designed 
to aid in effectuation of remedy. The court will not find that its procedure has in 
this instance prevented it. 
Id. at 1228. Accord Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 778 (1976). 
147. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(f)(I) (1982). 
148. See Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir. 19&4). 
In Howard, the court of appeals observed that Congress' preference for the administrative 
resolution of claims was reflected in the legislative history of the 1972 amendment to Title 
VII: 
It is hoped that recourse to the private lawsuit will be the exception and not the 
rule, and that the vast majority of complaints will be handled through the offices 
of the EEOC .... However, as the individual's right[J to redress are [sic] para­
mount under the provisions of Title VII it is necessary that all avenlies be left 
open for quick and effective relief. 
Id. at 1532 (quoting 118 CONGo REc. 7563, 7565 (Conference Report on H.R. 1746, Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972». 
149. 596 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1979). 
150. 726 F.2d 1529 (lith Cir. 1984). 
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sumptive right to await the conclusion of EEOC proceedings before 
filing suit, with an exception only in rare cases. 151 The following sec­
tion discusses the rationales relied upon in Bernard and Howard by the 
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, respectively, in 
establishing the general rule. 
1. 	 The General Rule: Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co. and Howard v. 
Roadway Express, Inc. 
In Bernard, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that in or­
der for the doctrine of laches to bar a Title VII action, it must be 
found both that the plaintiff delayed inexcusably in bringing suit and 
that the delay unduly prejudiced the defendant. The court, however, 
cautioned that a Title VII private plaintiff cannot be penalized for 
choosing to forego the alternative of privately bringing suit and "elect­
ing instead the legislatively and judicially favored method of relying 
on the administrative processes of the EEOC."ls2 
In Bernard, the plaintiffs failed to file their Title VII claims in 
federal court until completion of the EEOC process, some nine years 
after their original EEOC complaint. ls3 The only justification offered 
by the plaintiffs for this delay was their asserted right to await termi­
nation of the EEOC process. IS4 The court considered whether the 
plaintiffs failure to file the Title VII claims until after the completion 
of the EEOC's administrative process and conciliation efforts was un­
reasonable and inexcusable. ISS 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of 
laches did not bar the Title VII claim commenced by the private plain­
tiffs nine years after the filing of discrimination charges with the 
EEOC. In its determination, the court noted that the EEOC actively 
pursued the administrative process and conciliation efforts with the 
defendant company for almost all of the nine years. The court also 
considered the fact that the EEOC's efforts ultimately resulted in a 
conciliation agreement between the EEOC and the defendant. 156 
The court observed that although the plaintiffs had received no­
151. See Cleveland Newspaper Guild, Local I v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 839 
F.2d 1147 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 245 (1988); Boone v. Mechanical Specialties 
Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1979). See infra notes 165-78 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of such a rare case. 
152. 596 F.2d at 1257. 
153. [d. at 1253. 
154. [d. at 1256. 
155. [d. 
156. [d. at 1253-57. 
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tice from the EEOC that they could request a right-to-sue letter four­
teen months before the plaintiffs actually did request their right-to-sue 
letter, the EEOC had continued conciliation efforts up until one 
month prior to the plaintiffs' request. 157 The court concluded, there­
fore, that the plaintiffs' failure to file their Title VII claims until the 
completion of the EEOC's active, continuing administrative process 
was not inexcusable delay and subsequently failed to satisfy the re­
quirements of the defense of laches. 158 
157. Id. at 1253. 
158. Id. at 1257. See also Brown v. Continental Can Co., 765 F.2d 8\0 (9th Cir. 
1985). In Brown, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that lengthy delays by the 
EEOC "are not to be charged against private plaintiffs and that complainants are not re­
quired to terminate the administrative process by requesting a notice of right-to-sue." Id. 
at 815. The court acknowledged that this circuit had previously applied the doctrine of 
laches as a defense against a private plaintiff in a Title VII action, but held that the prior 
court's holding "stated the exception and not the general rule." Id. at 814. See Boone v. 
Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1979). 
The plaintiff in Brown filed two charges of employment discrimination with the 
EEOC. The first charge alleged racial discrimination in a training program and was filed in 
July, 1977. The second charge alleged discrimination in plaintiff's termination and was 
filed in November, 1978. Id. at 812. The EEOC commenced an investigation on the sec­
ond charge prior to the first charge, alleging discrimination in training. The EEOC, how­
ever, dismissed the termination charge in December, 1983, due to plaintiff's failure to 
respond to EEOC correspondence. A right-to-sue letter was thereafter issued to the plain­
tiff on January 26, 1983, regarding the discrimination in termination charge. The plaintiff 
did not file a civil action within the required ninety days of receipt of the right-to-sue letter. 
Id. 
Subsequently, the EEOC commenced an investigation on the discrimination in train­
ing charge. The EEOC determined that there was reasonable cause to believe the allega­
tions were true and, thereafter, made conciliation attempts with Continental. When 
conciliation efforts failed, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter to plaintiff on November 
17, 1983. Id. Thereupon the plaintiff filed suit within the 90-day limitation period pre­
scribed by statute. In the complaint, the plaintiff alleged discrimination in termination. 
Continental moved to dismiss the action, and the district court granted the motion, dis­
missing the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice because of the failure to file within ninety 
days of receipt of the January 26, 1983 right-to-sue letter issued on the termination charge. 
The plaintiff appealed the dismissal of the complaint to the court of appeals. Id. 
First the court of appeals determined that since the plaintiff filed the action within 
ninety days of a valid right-to-sue letter issued upon a prior, reasonably related incident of 
discrimination by the same employer, the plaintiff should be allowed to amend the com­
plaint to allege discrimination in training as well as discrimination in termination. The 
court further determined that the complaint, as amended, would be timely filed and there­
fore should not have been dismissed as untimely. Id. at 813-14. 
Continental contended that the district court's order should be affirmed on the alterna­
tive ground that the plaintiff's Title VII claim was barred by the doctrine of laches. In 
support of this claim, Continental presented affidavits alleging prejudice through loss of 
witnesses and the loss of plaintiff's personnel file. Id. at 814-15. The court, however, found 
that the plaintiff did not deliberately delay seeking a right-to-sue letter and further noted 
that Continental was on notice from the filing of the initial charge up to the issuance of the 
November 17, 1983 right-to-sue letter that it would be required to preserve whatever 
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In Howard, like Bernard, the court of appeals was confronted 
with the issue "whether plaintifll's] failure to file a private action until 
after the termination of the EEOC's active, continuing administrative 
process is unreasonable."159 Like the plaintiffs in Bernard, the private 
plaintiff in Howard asserted the right to await completion of the 
EEOC's administrative resolution of the Title VII claims. 160 Howard 
filed a Title VII race discrimination charge with the EEOC in Decem­
ber, 1976. 161 The defendant, Roadway, acknowledged receipt of the 
charge in January, 1977. In 1978, Howard's attorney requested a 
right-to-sue letter from the EEOC and then later withdrew the re­
quest. In December, 1981, five years after the initial charge was filed, 
the EEOC made a "no cause" determination and issued Howard a 
right-to-sue letter. Howard filed a claim in federal court in March of 
1982, within the required 90-day period after receiving the right-to-sue 
letter. 162 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that 
laches could be applied to Title VII actions brought by private plain­
tiffs, but saw no reason to make that exception under these circum­
stances and, therefore, held that Howard's failure to file his Title VII 
claim until the termination of the EEOC process was not inexcusable 
records it deemed necessary for its defense. Based on these facts, the court declined to 
affirm the district court's decision. [d. at 815. 
The court, therefore, held that its prior decision in Boone v. Mechanical Specialties 
Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1979), was not dispositive in this case. See infra note 178 for a 
discussion of the Boone decision. In fact, the court emphasized that Boone represented the 
exception to the general rule that the Title VII private plaintiff may rely on the EEOC's 
administration of Title VII claims. 765 F.2d at 814-15. See also Gifford v. Atchison, T. & 
S.F. Ry. Co., 685 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Ordinarily, if the EEOC retains control 
over a charge, a private plaintiff will not be charged with its mistakes."); Watson v. Gulf & 
Western Indus., 650 F.2d 990, 992 (9th Cir. 1981) ("A Title VII complainant is not 
charged with the commission's failure to perform its statutory duties.") (quoting Russell v. 
American Tobacco Co., 528 F.2d 357, 365 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 
(1976»; Bratton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 649 F.2d 658, 667 n.8 (9th Cir. 1980). 
159. Howard, 726 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir. 1984) (quoting Bernard, 596 F.2d 
1249, 1256 (5th Cir. 1979». 
160. 726 F.2d at 1532. 
161. [d. at 1531. 
162. [d. The court refused to distinguish this case from Bernard on the ground that 
in this instance the EEOC made a "no-cause" determination. [d. at 1533, n.2. In such a 
case, the court stated that "[a] plaintiff may not be faulted for relying on the administrative 
process prior to the issuance of a no-reasonable-cause determination, for there remains the 
potential that the EEOC investigation will result in conciliation or prosecution on the 
EEOC's part." [d. 
This holding is consistent with Congress' expressed preference for the administrative 
resolution of claims as reflected in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act. [d. at 
1532. It is also consistent with the Bernard conclusion that relying on the EEOC's admin­
istrative processes is the judicially favored method. [d. at 1533. 
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delay and could not support the defense of laches. 163 
The Bernard and Howard decisions support the general rule that 
private plaintiffs are not required to terminate the administrative pro­
cess by requesting a right-to-sue letter and may await the termination 
of EEOC proceedings before filing suit in a federal court. l64 These 
opinions are representative of the presumption which courts, in the 
absence of an exception, generally allow the private plaintiff to await 
termination of EEOC proceedings before filing suit. 
2. 	 An Exception To The General Rule: Cleveland Newspaper 
Guild, ~ocal 1 v. Plain Dealer Publishing CO.165 . 
In the wake of the disagreement among the courts of appeals as to 
whether the application of equitable principles to Title VII cases per­
mits a dismissal based on laches when a claimant chooses to await the 
termination of EEOC proceedings, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
ruled on the issue in Cleveland Newspaper. A sharply divided court of 
appeals held that a union that delayed filing in federal court for ten 
years while employment discrimination charges were pending at the 
EEOC is precluded by the defense of laches from pursuing its claim in 
court. 166 
163. Id. at 1533. Note that in Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th 
Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted as binding precedent 
all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October I, 1981. Bernard, 
therefore, is binding on the Howard court. . . 
164. See also Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199,211 (4th Cir. 1984), cerro de­
nied, 470 U.S. 1028 (1985) ("decision to rely on the commission's administrative process 
before initiating a private suit is not inexcusable delay"); Rozen V. District of Colu~bia, 
702 F.2d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
165. Cleveland Newspaper Guild, Local I v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 839 F.2d 
1147 (6th Cir.), cerro denied, 109 S. Ct. 245 (1988). 
166. /d. at 1155. In Cleveland Newspaper, the Cleveland Newspaper Guild (Guild) 
filed a sex discrimination charge with the EEOC on behalf of the Guild's female members 
on April 12, 1972. One month later the employer was notified of the charge by means of a 
form notice which did not name the persons who brought the charge, but stated that an 
EEOC regulation requires the employer to preserve all relevant personnel records until the 
charge is resolved. [d. at 1149. 
In 1974, the EEOC sent the Guild a form notice entitled "Charging Party Follow-up," 
which informed the Guild that the EEOC had not been able to process the charge and 
could not predict when it would begin to do so. The Guild was given the choice of keeping 
the charge open and having it processed when the EEOC could attend to it, suing the 
employer in federal court, or closing the charge without further action. The Guild elected 
to have the EEOC process the charge. [d. 
The EEOC's investigation began in May, 1976. At that time, the EEOC gave the 
employer a copy of the original charge which had been filed by the Guild on April 12, 1972. 
Upon receipt of the charge, the Plain Dealer requested that the EEOC dismiss the claim, 
asserting that the delay had substantially impaired its ability to respond. The EEOC re­
fused to dismiss the charge and, in June of 1976, requested that the Plain Dealer supply it 
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The issue considered by the en bane panel of the Sixth Circuit 
. Court of Appeals was whether the application of equitable principles 
to Title VII cases permits a dismissal based on laches when a claimant 
chooses to await the termination of EEOC proceedings before filing 
suit. Specifically, the court considered whether a claimant who awaits 
the outcome of the EEOC's administrative proceedings for a period of 
ten years before filing suit has caused inexcusable or unreasonable de­
iay and prejudice to the employer sufficient to justify the application of 
the doctrine of laches. 
In an 11-5 ruling, the court of appeals held that the ten year lapse 
between the union's filing of a sex discrimination charge with the 
EEOC and the filing of its Title VII suit constituted an unreasonable 
delay which prejudiced the employer's ability to defend itself against 
the Title VII charge. 167 The court ruled that the Title VII suit was, 
therefore, barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. 168 
The court of appeals began by analyzing other federal courts of 
appeals' decisions which had decided the laches issue in similar cir­
cumstances. 169 Based on an examination of each court to have consid­
ered the question, the Cleveland Newspaper court concluded that the 
doctrine of laches should apply to Title VII proceedings "in practice 
with documents and information regarding employees for the previous six years. The Plain 
Dealer refused to submit the requested information and the EEOC thereafter issued the 
employer a subpoena. The Plain Dealer immediately filed a petition seeking revocation 
and/or modification of the EEOC subpoena. One year later, the EEOC denied revocation 
and the employer then informed the EEOC it would not appear. Nothing further occurred 
until 1979 when the Guild wrote the EEOC concerning the status of the charge. Then in 
1980, the EEOC informed the Plain Dealer that it would not seek to enforce the 1976 
subpoena. Id. at 1149-50. 
On July 3, 1980, the employer responded to the Guild's charge and contended that 
because of the lapse of time, personnel and documents relevant to the charge were no 
longer available. On October 10, 1980, the EEOC issued a finding of reasonable cause and 
thereafter attempted to commence conciliation efforts. The attempts proved fruitless, and 
on May 21, 1982, ten years after the Guild filed its charge with the EEOC, the EEOC 
issued the Guild a right-to-sue letter. The Guild then filed suit. Id. at 1150. 
The Plain Dealer filed a motion for summary judgment based on the affirmative 
defense of laches. The trial court found plaintiff's delay in filing suit inexcusable and that 
the delay resulted in prejudice to the defendant in the form of unavailable witnesses, de­
struction of documentary evidence, and erosion of available witnesses' memories. The 
court, therefore, granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and the Guild 
appealed. On appeal, a panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 813 F.2d 101 
(6th Cir. 1987). On rehearing en bane, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's 
decision. 839 F.2d 1147, 1154-55 (6th Cir. 1988). 
167. Id. at 1154-55. Judge Guy wrote the majority opinion joined by three members 
of the court. Judges Lively, Merritt and Nelson each wrote separate concurring opinions. 
Judge Milburn dissented in an opinion joined by Judges Edwards, Keith and Jones. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 1151-53. 
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as well as theory."17o The court acknowledged that the EEOC's ad­
ministrative resolution of Title VII claims is the preferred method, but 
concluded that "in rare cases, the only avenue for relieving unfair prej­
udice to the defendant is dismissal of the plaintiff's claim,"171 on the 
basis of the doctrine of laches. 172 
In concluding that laches applied in this particular circumstance, 
170. Id. at 1153. 
171. Id. 
172. In a powerful dissent, Judge Milburn contended that section 706(f)(1) of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act and the policies it reflects precluded the invocation of the 
equitable doctrine of laches where the Title VII claimant elects to await completion of the 
EEOC's processing of the charge and the issuance of a right-to-sue letter. Id. at 1157. 
Judge Milburn proclaimed that "[c]ourts may not invoke the doctrine oflaches where to do 
so would be inconsistent with national policies and priorities established by Congress." Id. 
at 1158 (citation omitted). The dissent premised its argument on a literal reading of section 
706(f)(I) and on the recognition of the federal policy favoring the administrative resolution 
of employment discrimination claims before suit is brought in federal court. Specifically, 
the dissent argued that the mandatory language of section 706(f)(1) does not require a 
charging party to request a right-to-sue letter within a certain time, or at all. The literal 
language of section 706(f)(I) leads to the conclusion that after one hundred and eighty 
days have elapsed "the [charging party] may either file a private action within 90 days after 
EEOC notification or continue to leave the ultimate resolution of his charge to the efforts of 
the EEOC." /d. at 1159 (Milburn, J., dissenting) (quoting Occidental Life Ins. v. EEOC, 
432 U.S. 355, 361 (1977». The dissent argued further that "Congress expressly intended 
that recourse to a civil action would 'be the exception and not the rule, and that the vast 
majority of complaints [would] be handled through the offices of the [EEOq.''' Id. at 
1158 (Milburn, J., dissenting) (quoting 118 CONGo REc. 7563, 7565 (1972) (Conference 
Report on H.R. 1746, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972». Judge Milburn 
further argued that the legislative history "evinces that Congress did not intend the charg­
ing party's statutory right to await termination of EEOC proceedings to be emasculated by 
lengthy EEOC delays." Id. at 1159. . 
See also Cleveland Newspaper, 839 F.2d at 1162 (Keith, J., dissenting). Judge Keith 
concurred in Judge Milburn's dissenting opinion, and in a separate opinion stressed the 
irony of granting a Title VII defendant equitable relief: 
[I]t strikes me as ironic that plaintiff is being penalized for fully exhausting its 
administrative remedies-pursuant to a complex and comprehensive statutory 
scheme-rather than resorting to the courts for relief, while this Court, as well as 
the courts of most other jurisdictions, have been consistently unsympathetic. to 
plaintiffs who seek judicial relief prior to exhaustion even as a reaction to demon­
strably lengthy and time-consuming administrative procedures. Indeed, the re­
quirement that one exhaust all administrative remedies has been intoned with 
such frequency, despite the hardship for plaintiffs which can result, as to have 
become liturgically axiomatic. 
Id. See also Cleveland Newspaper, 839 F.2d at 1163 (Jones, J., dissenting) ("[T]he ag­
grieved filed their complaints with the EEOC in a timely manner. By engrafting a laches 
defense onto the statute this court majority is doing the opposite of what Congress in­
tended."). See also Cleveland Newspaper, 839 F.2d at 1163 (Edwards, J., dissenting) ("In 
my view of this case the majority opinion simply amends the statute to provide a time 
limitation not adopted by Congress and not justified in equity."). 
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the court pointed to the following factors as sufficient support for the 
district court's finding of inexcusable delay by the plaintiff: 
1) plaintiff's knowledge of its ability to obtain a right-to-sue letter 

and institute a civil action; 





3) plaintiff's lack of activity over the eight year period; 
4) plaintiff's lack of contact with the EEOC during that period; 
5) the EEOC's lack of activity during this time which could ex­
plain plaintiff's failure to act; 
6) the EEOC's failure to take enforcement action on the subpoena 
issued to the defendant; and 
7) the lack of a conciliation agreement between the plaintiff and 
defendant. 173 
Relying on these factors, the Cleveland Newspaper court affirmed the 
district court's finding that the plaintiff's lack of diligence in filing suit 
was inexcusable. 174 
In concluding that plaintiff's inexcusable delay caused prejudice 
to the defendant, the court relied on the employer's affidavits which 
detailed the loss of key defense witnesses and relevant documentary 
evidence. The plaintiff did not dispute the finding of prejudice, but 
contended that the prejudice the defendant suffered resulted from its 
own error. Specifically, plaintiff argued that the defendant had re­
ceived notice that a sex discrimination charge had been filed with the 
EEOC and that the defendant was ordered to retain all relevant 
records. 175 In rejecting this argument, the court of appeals agreed 
with the district court that the EEOC notice to the defendant was too 
ambiguous to serve as a valid command. The court reasoned that the 
defendant did not know which personnel files were relevant because it 
did not receive a copy of the charge until four years after it was filed 
with the EEOC. 176 The court noted further that even if the defendant 
had retained all of the relevant records, that still would not have re­
duced the amount of prejudice to defendant, due to witnesses who 
were no longer available or whose memories had faded. 177 
173. Id. at 1154. 
174. /d. The court further noted that the EEOC's actions are only one factor consid­
ered by the court in assessing the reasonableness of the plaintiff's actions. The court must 
still make its determination based on whether the plaintiff's own delay or lack of diligence 
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On the basis of all the facts presented, the Cleveland Newspaper 
court found no abuse of discretion in the di/itrict court's dismissal of 
the plaintiff's Title VII claim. More importantly, however, the court 
recognized the "understandable" reluctance courts have shown to dis­
miss Title VII claims and limited the defense of laches to "rare 
cases." 178 
The Bernard and Howard opmlons, discussed above, represent 
178. Id. at 1153. See also Boone v. Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th 
Cir. 1979). In Boone, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that laches may be 
used as a defense to a Title VII action. The court found that a plaintiff who delayed filing 
in federal court for almost seven years while charges were pending at the EEOC, was pre­
cluded by the defense of laches from pursuing the claim in court. Specifically, the court 
determined that the plaintiff's delay was unreasonable and defendant employer was se­
verely prejudiced as a result. Id. at 959·60. In its conclusion, however, the court empha­
sized that the finding in this case "state[d] the exception and not the general rule." Id. at 
960. 
In this case, the plaintiff filed a racial discrimination charge with the EEOC in Octo­
ber, 1969, alleging wrongful termination. The charge remained pending with the EEOC for 
nearly seven years, until plaintiff requested and received a right-to-sue letter on August 3, 
1976. Plaintiff filed suit in a federal district court in December, 1976. Id. at 957. 
The district court entered an order dismissing the plaintiff's action on the merits. Spe­
cifically, the district court found that "[b]ecause [plaintiff's] substantial delay in bringing 
this action was inexcusable and has resulted in severe prejudice to [the defendant em­
ployer], [defendant] is entitled to a dismissal of this action under the doctrine of laches." 
Id. at 958 (quoting from the district court's finding below). 
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the defendant should have been on notice of the 
Title VII claim because the charge had remained on the books over all those years. In 
addition, plaintiff contended that the defendant could have preserved the testimony of the 
lost witnesses and avoided the prejudice which resulted with the passage of time. Id. at 
959. 
The issue considered by the court of appeals was whether laches or an unreasonable 
delay may bar a Title VII claim. In concluding that laches applied in this particular cir­
cumstance, the court pointed to the following factors as sufficient support for the district 
court's finding of inexcusable delay by the plaintiff: 
I) plaintiff's knowledge of its right to request and receive a right-to-sue 
letter and bring an action in federal court at an earlier time; 
2) plaintiff's failure to request such right-to-sue letter; 
3) plaintiff's rejection of the EEOC's earlier offers of right-to-sue letters; 
and 
4) the lack of evidence from which the court could infer an excuse for the 
delay. 
Id. at 957-59. Based on these factors, the court of appeals concluded that the district court 
was correct in finding that the plaintiff's delay was unreasonable. The court further stated 
that "Title VII clearly cannot countenance the type of delay which occurred in the present 
case." Id. at 959. 
In concluding that the plaintiff's unreasonable delay resulted in prejudice to the de­
fendant, the court relied on the evidence offered by the defendant detailing the loss of 
defense witnesses and relevant personnel files. In addition, the court stated that "[i]n the 
absence of any type of continuing administrative proceedings (as opposed to a sleeping 
claim)," the defendant was not under an affirmative duty to avoid the prejudice. Id. at 960. 
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prime examples of the court decisions which grant Title VII plaintiffs 
the presumption that they are entitled to await the completion of the 
EEOC's administration of a claim before filing suit, as opposed to 
favoring the application of the doctrine of laches to the Title VII 
claims. These courts encourage the informal conciliation of Title VII 
claims through the office of the EEOC and allow the defense of laches 
only in rare circumstances where no other avenue for relief exists. 
Cleveland Newspaper is one such "rare case" in which the Sixth Cir­
cuit Court of Appeals stated the exception and not the general rule. 
Conversely, the Garrett and Jeffries opinions, discussed in the 
preceding section, are representative of the courts which take the clas­
sic laches approach and readily apply the doctrine of laches to bar 
Title VII claimants from indefinitely awaiting the conclusion of EEOC 
proceedings. These classic laches cases, when compared and con­
trasted with the presumption cases, exemplify the basic dispute which 
exists among the federal courts of appeals on the question of the appli­
cability of the doctrine of laches when a plaintiff awaits the completion 
of EEOC proceedings before filing suit. In light of the preceding dis­
cussion, this comment will propose an appropriate resolution of the 
laches issue. 
IV. AN EQUITABLE ALTERNATIVE To THE LACHES DISMISSAL 
The various decisions of the courts of appeals, discussed above, 
illustrate that the status of a Title VII claimant's right to indefinitely 
delay bringing suit until the completion of EEOC proceedings varies 
among the courts considering this issue. Viable arguments for and 
against the application of the equitable doctrine of laches in such cir­
cumstances are not hard to make. On one hand, one can reasonably 
argue that a Title VII claimant's patience in awaiting completion of 
conciliation efforts is not to be considered unreasonable or inexcusable 
in light of the "federal policy requiring employment discrimination 
claims to be ... , whenever possible, administratively resolved before 
suit is brought in a federal court."179 Conversely, it is just as reason­
able to make the argument, in pursuance of equity, that the Title VII 
claimant's statutory rights under section 706 of the Civil Rights Act 
are outweighed by the defendant's right to defend against a Title VII 
Thus, the court held that the district court did not err in the finding of prejudice to the 
defendant. Id. 
On the basis of all the facts presented, the Boone court found no clear error in the 
district court's finding of unreasonable delay on the part of the plaintiff and prejudice to the 
defendant. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. Id. at 959-60. 
179. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 368 (1977). 
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claim without undue prejudice. ISO 
The conflict between the courts is plain. It is also apparent that 
these courts disagree as to what point in time the length of the delay 
between the plaintiff's initial filing of a charge with the EEOC and 
subsequent bringing of a suit in federal district court becomes unrea­
sonable or inexcusable. The practical result of this lack of established 
guidelines has been for the federal courts of appeals to make ad hoc 
determinations based on the particular circumstances of each case. 
While there appears to be no bright-line rule to apply to this ques­
tion, there exists an equitable alternative to circumvent the result. 
When the doctrine of laches is applied to a Title VII claim, the defense 
acts as a bar, and the ultimate consequence is dismissal. This result is 
contrary to the central statutory purposes of Title VII to eradicate 
discrimination and make persons whole for injuries suffered through 
past discrimination. Conversely, when the application of the doctrine 
of laches to a Title VU claim is denied, the consequence is that the 
employer is unduly prejudiced in making a defense. This result is con­
trary to the fundamental concept of fairness and equity. 
In light of the resulting conflicts, there appears to be an alterna­
tive which balances the various equities between the parties and 
reaches a result which is both consistent with the purposes of Title VII 
and the concept of fairness. Specifically, an alternative method, more 
appropriate and perhaps more effective than the laches dismissal, 
would be to use the laches defense to decrease exposure to back pay 
liability. lSI 
As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit suggested in EEOC 
180. Jeffries v. Chicago Transit Auth., 770 F.2d 676, 677 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. de­
nied, 475 U.S. 1050 (1986). 
181. The principal relief to a Title VII plaintiff is the back pay award, "which serves 
to compensate the victim for the renumerati'on ... lost as a result of the unlawful act and to 
deter future violations of the act." C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, EMPLOY­
MENT DISCRIMINATION part V at I (2d ed. 1988). The back pay period commences on the 
date the alleged unlawful employment discrimination occurred. Id. § 14.4.3, at 19. How­
ever, an employer is not liable for back pay for any period prior to two years before the 
charge was filed with the EEOC. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). Furthermore, the back 
pay period normally ends on the date the court enters judgment for the plaintiff and orders 
reinstatement, employment, or promotion. C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 14.4.3 at 21 (2d ed. 1988). But see Kamberos v. GTE 
Automatic Elec., Inc., 603 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1060 (1981); 
Lynn v. Western Gillette, Inc.,.564 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1977). See infra notes 191-96 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the Lynn and Kamberos cases. Specifically, 42 
U.S.c. § 2000e-5(g) provides: "Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than 
two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission. Interim earnings or amounts 
earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall 
operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable." Id. ' 
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v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 182 even if a district court finds that 
the elements of laches have been proven, the district court in the exer­
cise of its discretion, "must take into account whether or not a less 
drastic form of equitable relief than a complete dismissal of the action 
would have been more appropriate."183 In Great Atlantic, the court 
further suggested that prior references by the Supreme Court "to the 
district court's power to afford protection from prejudice arising from 
delays in prosecution may well speak only to the discretion which 42 
U.S.c. § 2000e-5(g) ... affords respecting the imposition of back pay 
liability rather than other forms of prospective equitable relief."184 
The statutory authority for making awards of back pay in Title 
VII cases is cast in language that emphasizes flexibility and discretion 
in fashioning an appropriate remedy: 
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or 
is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice 
charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from 
engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such af­
firmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is 
not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without 
back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems 
appropriate. 185 
182. 735 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1984). In Great Atlantic, the EEOC appealed from a sum­
mary judgment in favor of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company. The district court 
held that the EEOC's complaint, which sought injunctive relief and back pay, must be 
dismissed on the ground of laches. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding 
that the defense of laches was not available in view of the fact that there was no inexcusable 
delay in the administrative process. Id. at 84-85. 
183. Id. at 81. In addition, "[t]he court's discretion must also be exercised commen­
surately with Congress' purpose that the [EEOC's] capacity to investigate charges of dis­
crimination not be undermined." Id. 
184. Id. at 80 (citing Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 373 (1977), 
and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424-25 (1975». See Occidental, 432 
U.S. at 373 (back pay may be denied or restricted when delay by EEOC in bringing action 
handicaps defendant significantly); Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 424-'25 (back pay may be re­
stricted or denied when private plaintiff's unexcused conduct prejudices defendant). 
185. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(g) (1982) (emphasis added). The fact that Congress pro­
vided the courts with this equitable power indicates the purpose of Title VII to make per­
sons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination. The 
"make whole" purpose of Title VII is made evident by the legislative history. 118 CONGo 
REc. 7166, 7168 (Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 - Conference Report); 118 
CONGo REc. 7563, 7565 (Conference Report on H.R. 1746, Equal Employment Opportu­
nity Act of 1972). In fact, a section-by-section analysis accompanying the Conference 
Committee Report on the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 clearly stated the 
"make whole" purpose of Title VII: 
The provisions of this subsection are intended to give the courts wide discretion 
exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most complete relief possible. In 
dealing with the present section 706(g) the courts have stressed that the scope of 
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The general principles governing the award of back pay under the Ti­
tle VII back pay provision were enunciated by the Supreme Court in 
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody; 186 the Court stated that the discretion 
accorded by Title VII's back pay provision, while equitable in nature, 
must be exercised in light of the deterrence and "make whole" pur­
poses of Title VII. Thus, "given a finding of unlawful discrimination, 
backpay should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, 
would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating dis­
crimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for 
injuries suffered through past discrimination."187 
The Albemarle Court specifically considered the application of 
this principle in the context of the equitable defense of laches. Despite 
the legislative emphasis on the "make whole" purpose of Title VII and 
in light of the statutory emphasis on discretion, the Court held that a 
Title VII plaintiff "may not be 'entitled' to relief if its conduct of the 
cause has improperly and substantially prejudiced the other party." 188 
Furthermore, the Albemarle Court held that "[t]o deny backpay be­
cause a particular cause has been prosecuted in an eccentric fashion, 
prejudicial to the other party, does not offend the broad purposes of 
Title VII."189 In effect, the Court concluded that the district court's 
denial of back pay was within its discretionary power, in light of the 
circumstances peculiar to the case. 190 
In two appellate decisions, a private plaintiff's delay in filing suit 
was used as the basis for reducing the back pay award pursuant to the 
defense of laches. 191 In both cases, the plaintiff allowed a discrimina­
tion charge to remain before the EEOC long after entitled to a right­
to-sue letter and after the EEOC had ceased conciliation efforts. In 
Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Elec., Inc.,192 the Title VII plaintiff per-
relief under that section of the Act is intended to make the victims 'of unlawful 
discrimination whole, and that the attainment of this objective rests not only 
upon the elimination of the particular unlawful employment practice complained 
of, but also requires that persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the 
unlawful employment practice be, so far as possible, restored to a position where 
they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination. 
Id. 
186. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
187. Id.at421. 
188. Id. at 424. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Elec., Inc., 603 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 454 U.S. 1060 (1981); Lynn v. Western Gillette, Inc., 564 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 
1977). 
192. 603 F.2d 598 (1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1060 (1981). 
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mitted a discrimination claim to lie dormant with the EEOC for over 
four years, despite the fact that she was a lawyer and knew that she 
could request a right-to-sue letter one hundred and eighty days after 
the filing of the complaint. In light of these circumstances, the Sev­
enth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's award of back 
pay should have been reduced by subtracting from the end of the back 
pay period, an amount of time equivalent to the time between the expi­
ration of the ISO-day period and the date when the right-to-sue letter 
was actually received by the plaintiff. 193 
In Lynn v. Western Gillette, Inc. ,194 the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that "where the aggrieved party has consulted counsel 
and is aware of this right [to request a right-to-sue letter], it becomes 
inequitable at some point for the employee to delay filing SUit."195 The 
court further stated that "it is proper for the district court, in the exer­
cise of its equitable discretion, to take the plaintiff's lack of diligence 
into account in determining the amount of back pay, if any, to be 
awarded the plaintiff should he prevail on the merits."l96 
As these cases illustrate, in particular cases where the Title VII 
defendant is in fact prejudiced by a plaintiff's unreasonable or unex­
cused delay in filing suit while waiting for the termination of EEOC 
proceedings, the district courts can use their discretion and limit the 
back pay relief to a period of reasonable diligence. This remedy in 
effect allows the Title VII plaintiff to proceed on the merits of the 
employment discrimination claim. 197 Furthermore, the result is rec­
oncilable with the purpose of Title VII: the Title VII plaintiff is made 
whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment dis­
crimination and the employer is enjoined from engaging in the unlaw­
ful employment practice. The result is also in accordance with the 
equitable concept of fairness: the Title VII defendant's liability is lim­
ited to a reasonable period consistent with the equitable doctrine of . 
laches. 
Under this approach, the elements of the laches defense are the 
same. The result, however, is a less draconian remedy than dismissal. 
Ultimately, if the district court finds that the Title VII defendant has 
193. Id. at 603. 
194. 564 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1977). 
195. Id. at 1287. 
196. /d. at 1288. 
197. In the event the Title VII plaintiff's claim is without merit and the defendant 
prevails, the court has the authority to assess a reasonable attorney's fee against the plain­
tiff. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(k) (1982) provides: "[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the 
prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs ...." 42 U.S.c. 
§ 2000e-5(k). 
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satisfied both elements of the laches defense (namely, that the delay by 
the plaintiff is unreasonable and the defendant has been prejudiced in 
making a defense), it is in the court's discretion to determine the ap­
propriate equitable relief. 
The determination of such equitable relief in Title VII cases 
hinges on the balancing of the concerns of both parties and the result 
must reflect the policies of Title VII and the essential element of fair­
ness. Limiting back pay to a period of reasonably diligent pursuit 
would be consistent with the equitable nature of the doctrine of 
laches. 19B In addition, because the filing of any charge with the EEOC 
places an employer on notice of the potential liability and consequent 
need to preserve testimony, dismissal would seldom l99 be appropriate 
198. It is also consistent with the equitable nature of the laches defense for the dis­
trict court's determination of the period of "reasonably diligent pursuit" to be made on an 
ad hoc basis, in light of the particular circumstances of each case. Guided by this ad hoc 
standard, the district courts may determine the amount of back pay relief appropriate in 
each case. 
For example, in Garrett v. General Motors Corp., the Distnct Court for the Eastern 
District of Missouri had determined that the plaintiff's contact with the EEOC was mini­
mal between 1972 and 1980, and that the plaintiff did not actively pursue the discrimina­
tion claim until 1984. 844 F.2d at 562. Under such circumstances, the district court could 
take the plaintiff~s lack of diligence into account in determining the amount of back pay to 
be awarded. Specifically, the court could subtract, from the end of the back pay period, an 
amount of time equivalent to the time between 1972 and 1984 that the plaintiff showed a 
lack of diligence in the pursuit of the employment discrimination claim. Id. See supra 
notes 119-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap­
peals' decision in Garrett. 
Similarly, in Jeffries v. Chicago Transit Auth., the District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois had determined that the delay which barred this claim dated from the 
time the plaintiff spoke with the EEOC in 1975 and the time plaintiff filed suit in 1984. 770 
F.2d at 679-80. Applying the back pay limitation approach under these circumstances, the 
district court could subtract, from the end of the back pay period, an amount of time 
equivalent to the time between 1975 and 1984 that the plaintiff showed a lack of diligence. 
Id. See supra notes 130-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals' decision in Jeffries. 
As these cases illustrate, the determination of the appropriate relief in Title VII cases 
hinges on a balancing of the various equities between the parties. In addition, the result of 
the district court's limitation of the back pay relief awarded, should the plaintiff prevail on 
the merits, is consistent with the "make whole" purposes of Title VII and the fundamental 
concept of fairness. 
199. It should be noted that in Cleveland Newspaper, the court found that the 
EEOC's notice to the defendant to retain personnel records "was too ambiguous to serve as 
a valid command." 839 F.2d at 1154. That notice, however, did not name the person or 
persons bringing the charge. Additionally, the notice asked that the defendant withhold 
any questions about the complaint until the EEOC's investigation began. Four years later, 
the defendant received a copy of the charge filed by the plaintiff. Under these circum­
stances, the court found that the defendant was prejudiced as a result of the four year delay 
that occurred before the defendant received a copy of the charge. Moreover, the court 
determined that prior to receiving an actual copy of the charge, it would be "impossible to 
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because any prejudice could have been mitigated.2°O Moreover, limit­
ing back pay in particular circumstances where the delay by the em­
ployee significantly handicaps the employer is consistent with the 
broad purposes of Title VII. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, using the defense of laches as a method to decrease 
exposure to liability rather than as a complete dismissal of a Title VII 
action provides for an equitable method for balancing the competing 
concerns between the Title VII plaintiff and defendant. Although the 
doctrine of laches has been applied to bar a Title VII claimant from 
indefinitely awaiting the conclusion of EEOC proceedings before filing 
suit, in the future laches should seldom be recognized as a complete 
bar to a Title VII lawsuit. Instead, Title VII claims should be decided 
on the merits; the laches defense will prove useful to decrease potential 
liability and will allow the courts to reach "a just result" without' lim­
determine which personnel records were 'relevant' to the unknown charge." Id. See supra 
notes 165-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Cleveland Newspaper decision. 
In such a case, where the Title VII defendant is not put on notice as to which person­
nel records are relevant to a particular employment discrimination charge, the defendant is 
not provided with the opportunity to avoid the prejudice in making a defense which results 
from the delay in providing notice of the charge. Under these circumstances, dismissal of a 
plaintiff's claim may be appropriate. As the court emphasized in Cleveland Newspaper, 
however, this "is an extreme result, and should be accomplished only when the prejudice to 
the defendant can be avoided in no other way." Id. at 1155. 
200. Pursuant to authority conferred upon it by 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-8(c) (1982), the 
EEOC has promulgated 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14, which requires an employer covered by Title 
VII to retain aU personnel records for six months after they are created and, when a charge 
of discrimination has been filed against the employer, to retain aU records relevant to the 
charge until the dispute is resolved. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 provides: 
Any personnel or employment record made or kept by an employer ... shaU be 
preserved by the employer for a period of 6 months from the date of the making 
of the record or the personnel action involved .... Where a charge of discrimina­
tion has been filed . . . the respondent employer shaU preserve aU personnel 
records relevant to the charge or action until final disposition of the charge or the 
action. The term "personnel records relevant to the charge," for example, would 
include personnel or employment records relating to the aggrieved person and to 
aU other employees holding positions similar to that held or sought by the ag­
grieved person and application forms or test papers completed by an unsuccessful 
applicant and by aU other candidates for the same position as that for which the 
aggrieved person applied and was rejected. 
29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 (1988). See supra note 142 and accompanying text. In addition, both 
Title VII itself and the EEOC regulations authorize the EEOC to have "access to," "the 
right to copy," and the power to require the production of documents. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e­
8(a) (1982); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.16(a) (1988). Both also authorize the power to require the 
attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of evidence. Id. § 2000e-8, 29 
C.F.R. § 1601.16. 
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iting the rights of the Title VII plaintiff to an administrative resolution 
of claims. 
Ellen N. Derrig 
